Pension Policy: New Evidence on Key Issues. ESRI RESEARCH SERIES NUMBER 14 NOVEMBER 2009 by Callan, Tim et al.
RESEARCH SERIES
NUMBER 14
NOVEMBER 2009
Pension Policy:
New Evidence on
Key Issues
TIM CALLAN
CLAIRE KEANE
JOHN R. WALSH
ESRI
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH SERIES  
NUMBER 14 
NOVEMBER 2009 
 
 
 
PENSION POLICY: 
NEW EVIDENCE ON 
KEY ISSUES  
 
 
 
TIM CALLAN  
CLAIRE KEANE 
JOHN R. WALSH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available online at www.esri.ie 
The Economic and Social Research Institute (Limited Company No. 18269). 
Registered Office: Whitaker Square,  
Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2. 
 
 
  
 
 
Tim Callan is a Research Professor, Claire Keane is a Research Assistant and John R. Walsh is a 
Senior Research Analyst at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
 
This paper has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does not itself take 
institutional policy positions. Accordingly, the authors are solely responsible for the content and 
the views expressed. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH SERIES  
NUMBER 14 
NOVEMBER 2009 
 
 
 
PENSION POLICY: 
NEW EVIDENCE ON 
KEY ISSUES  
 
 
 
TIM CALLAN  
CLAIRE KEANE 
JOHN R. WALSH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
DUBLIN, 2009 
 
ISBN 978 0 7070 0293 4 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 We are grateful to the referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks are also due to 
Philip O’Connell and Frances Ruane for valuable suggestions. We owe a particular debt to Brian 
Nolan for his advice on a number of key issues. We bear sole responsibility for any remaining 
errors or obscurities. 
 
Preparation of the document for printing was undertaken with their usual skill and efficiency by 
Deirdre Whitaker, Mary Cleary and Regina Moore; we are indebted to them for the care and 
attention to detail they have shown. 
 
 
IV 
 CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
Executive Summary VII 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 1.1 Context of the Study 1 
 1.2 Outline of the Study 2 
 
2. Pension Incentives: Some International Evidence 4 
 2.1 Introduction 4 
 2.2 UK Pensions Commission 4 
 2.3 Pension Incentives: Evidence from the UK and the US 6 
 2.4 Behavioural Issues 8 
 2.5 Implications for Ireland 9 
 
3. Framework for the Analysis 11 
 3.1 Introduction 11 
 3.2 SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-benefit Model 11 
 3.3 Changes in Demographic Structure 15 
 3.4 Measures of Poverty 16 
 3.5 Conclusion 17 
 
4. Distributional Implications of Long-Run Changes in Pension Coverage 18 
 4.1 Introduction 18 
 4.2 Rising Pension Coverage and “At Risk of Poverty” Measures for Pensioners 18 
 4.3 Impact of Increased Coverage of State Contributory Pension 20 
 4.4 Conclusion 24 
 
5. Alternative Tax Treatments of Pensions 25 
 5.1 Introduction 25 
 5.2 Tax Treatments of Pensions 25 
 5.3 Standard-rating of Tax Relief on Pensions 27 
 5.4 Tax Relief on Pensions a Single, Hybrid Rate 34 
 5.5 Conclusion 36 
 
6. The Public Service Pension Levy (2009) 38 
 6.1 Introduction 38 
 6.2 Interpreting the “Pension Related Deduction” 39 
 6.3 Impact of the “Pension-Related Deduction” 41 
 6.4 Conclusion 43 
 
7. Conclusion 45 
 
Bibliography  47 
 
 
 
 
V 
  
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Pension systems world-wide face major long-term challenges in providing 
adequate incomes in retirement to an ageing population. Ireland is no 
exception. While at present there are more than five people of working age 
for each person of pension age, by 2061, assuming pension age is 
unchanged, there would be no more than two. Defined benefit (DB) 
schemes have come under particular pressure, and a shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution (DC) schemes has been evident in Ireland 
as in other countries. In part, this reflects the fact that DB schemes tend to 
place the risk arising from increased longevity on the scheme funder, 
whereas DC schemes limit the liability of the funder but put a greater risk 
on the pension-holder. The government’s Green Paper on Pensions explored 
how the Irish pensions system might best be reformed to address the 
challenges of providing adequate pensions at an affordable cost in the 
context of increased longevity. In doing so, it raised a number of key 
questions for consideration. This study is designed to provide new 
evidence on some of these questions, relating mainly to the structuring of 
tax incentives to encourage improved coverage of private pensions. Earlier 
this year the government introduced a “Pension-related Deduction” – 
more commonly called the public service pension levy. We examine the 
nature of this policy instrument, and how it is to be interpreted. 
Context 
 
 To what extent do tax incentives induce new savings for retirement? Also 
to what extent do they simply subsidise pension contributions which would 
have taken place in the absence of the incentive, or lead to a reallocation of 
savings towards the tax-favoured option, rather than a net increase in 
savings. These issues have been extensively investigated in both the US and 
the UK, where tax incentives for retirement saving have been much used. 
There is, as yet, no consensus on this. Some recent studies of Individual 
Retirement Accounts in the US, and Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts 
(TESSA) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISA) in the UK conclude that 
only small fractions of the amounts saved in these schemes represented 
new savings. The corollary is that these policies have been an expensive 
means of encouraging saving, with large deadweight losses associated with 
the reshuffling of existing savings. Other studies see policy changes 
encouraging individual retirement accounts as having contributed to an 
enormous increase in defined contribution plan assets and more than 
offsetting declines in defined benefit plans. Whatever about the overall 
impact on new savings, it has been found that households who normally 
save the most were largely contributing funds that they would have saved 
anyway. Taken together, these results suggest that tax incentives do face a 
substantial “deadweight” problem, of subsidising savings that would take 
place anyway; and that this is particularly so for those at higher incomes. 
International 
Evidence 
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 We explore the direct impact of changes in the tax treatment of pensions 
using the SWITCH tax-benefit model. The model simulates the tax 
liabilities and benefit entitlements of a nationally representative sample of 
households – the data are drawn from the CSO’s Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU SILC) for 2005. A weighting scheme is used to 
adjust the data to represent the demographic situation in 2030 and 2050. 
All of the model results are based on the technical assumption of no 
change in behaviour. The fact that social welfare entitlements are 
incorporated in the model means that it is possible to analyse the direct 
impact of restrictions on income tax relief, coupled with an increase in 
social welfare pensions. These results could equally be interpreted in terms 
of changes in taxes helping to sustain existing levels of payment. 
Framework 
 
 Before analysing potential policy changes, we examine the potential 
impact of trends towards increasing coverage in occupational and private 
pensions, and in qualification rates for the contributory State Pension. 
Occupational/private pension coverage among current pensioners is about 
30 per cent, but stands at about 60 per cent for the over 30s. This 
difference reflects the fact that the rate of pension coverage has been rising 
over time. If this higher rate of coverage is sustained then future pensioner 
populations will be more likely to have an entitlement to a private or 
occupational pension than the current cohort of pensioners. What 
implications would this have for the “at risk of poverty” measure for future 
pensioners? We estimate that this factor could reduce the “at risk of 
poverty” measure by about one-third – both in terms of the familiar head 
count ratio, but also in terms of broader measures taking account of the 
depth of poverty. In a similar fashion, we analyse the impact of increased 
rates of qualification for the contributory State Pension. This factor could 
lead to a reduction in the head count of poverty of about one-fifth, and 
would also help to reduce the depth of poverty. 
Implications 
of Long-run 
Changes in 
Pension 
Coverage 
 
 Debate about the appropriate tax base has, in the past, often been 
characterised as a contest between an income base and an expenditure 
base. More recent reviews of this area conclude that the optimal tax system 
contains some form of taxation of capital income, and a more productive 
question is how to tax capital income, given that earnings are subject to tax. 
Tax 
Treatment of 
Pensions 
 
In this context we examine some possible changes to the current tax 
treatment of pensions, which can be characterised as following expenditure 
tax lines, while most direct taxes operate using income as a base. One 
alternative is that relief on contributions could be restricted to the standard 
rate of tax. This would imply a reduction in income tax relief for top rate 
taxpayers, but no change for those paying the standard rate. Our main 
findings include the following: 
 
• Standardisation of relief on all pension contributions (employee, 
employer and implicit government contributions) could raise 
revenue of over €1,000 million per annum. 
 
• More than four-fifths of the revenue raised would come from the 
richest one-fifth of tax units. 
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• Revenue raised could be applied to sustaining State pension levels 
as demographic pressures on the financing of public pensions 
intensify. 
 
• An increase in the relief from the standardised level to allow relief 
at a hybrid, 30 per cent rate – an option similar to that 
recommended by the Commission on Taxation would lead to gains 
which are concentrated on those with high incomes; but compared 
to the present situation would involve gains for standard rate 
taxpayers and losses for top rate taxpayers.  
 
Currently, tax relief on pension contributions is of greatest value to 
those with incomes high enough to pay the top rate of tax. Evidence from 
UK and US studies suggests that there is significant deadweight loss 
associated with such incentives, and that there are a number of key factors 
outside of tax incentives which can be changed to promote greater pension 
coverage. Our reading of this international evidence, and of our own 
findings, is that take-up of pensions among those on low to middle 
incomes would be best tackled by measures addressing the decision costs 
which pose an obstacle to enrolment in pension schemes. These could 
include what the Green Paper terms a “soft mandatory” scheme, in which 
the default option is enrolment in the scheme, but individuals may exercise 
their right to opt out; and a system of partial matching of contributions, at 
a single rate, rather than tax relief. 
 
 The pension-related deduction was introduced in response to a crisis in 
the public finances. Should it now be regarded as a temporary measure, to 
be reversed or revised? Or should it be seen as a new instrument of policy 
for the longer term, giving government new leverage to attain goals with 
respect to public finance outcomes, public-private sector wage differentials 
and/or income distribution? Our analysis suggests some caution is 
appropriate in thinking about a future role for the pension-related 
deduction. 
Public 
Service 
Pension Levy 
(Pension-
Related 
Deduction) 
 
Perhaps the strongest rationale for the pension-related deduction is that 
it serves as a mechanism for reducing net public sector spending, while 
avoiding the political economy difficulties of reducing wage rates explicitly. 
However, there are serious disadvantages associated with achieving the cost 
reduction in this fashion, which involves concentrating the burden of 
adjustment on those currently in employment, while they are in 
employment. An explicit wage rate reduction would also reduce the 
incomes of current and future pensioners. The pension-related deduction 
does not do this. In this way, it increases the replacement rates for public 
sector workers facing retirement decisions – tending to reduce labour 
supply, in a similar way to an income tax increase. Moreover, the 
progressive structure of the levy may damage labour market efficiency in 
the public sector. Broader tax/welfare measures to achieve distributional 
and anti-poverty goals may be more appropriate. 
 
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The long-term challenges facing pension systems worldwide have been 
compounded by the current economic crisis.1 OECD (2009) estimates that 
private pension funds worldwide lost more than one-fifth of their value 
during 2008, with losses for Irish funds exceeding one-third. Despite this, 
the OECD argues that Diversifying pension provision remains the right strategy, in 
the face of demographic, political, economic and financial risks (OECD, 2009). 
1.1  
Context of 
the Study 
 
Restructuring Ireland’s pension system to deal with the challenges ahead 
was the theme of the Green Paper on Pensions (Department of Social and 
Family Affairs, 2007). These challenges include the ageing of the 
population, with the ratio of those aged 65 years and over to those aged 18-
64 years rising from 20 per cent at present to around 50 per cent in 2061. 
The Green Paper outlined four broad approaches to the development of 
the pension system: 
 
1. Enhancement of the current system of voluntary pension 
provision, through a system of matching contributions from the 
State or provision of tax relief at the top rate of income tax in 
respect of all contributors. 
 
2. Introduction of a mandatory pension scheme, with a total 
contribution of 15 per cent of eligible income, of which 5 per 
cent (one-third) would be from the State. As set out in the 
Green Paper, this State contribution would be in place of tax 
reliefs on pension contributions currently provided. 
 
3. A so-called “soft mandatory” approach would involve 
mandatory enrolment in a pension scheme, but allow for 
individuals to opt out after a certain period. This need not be a 
“one-shot” process; the default option might be that the 
process is repeated several times, so that after a few years, 
individuals who had opted out would be enrolled in the scheme 
– unless they chose to opt out again. 
 
4. The Green Paper also considers the provision of enhanced 
social welfare benefits, for example, a phased increase in the 
level of Social Welfare pensions relative to average earnings, 
combined with a gradual increase in the retirement age.  
 
In the course of its examination of these options, the Green Paper 
highlights a number of “questions for consideration”. This report focuses 
on a selection of these questions, relating mainly to alternative forms of tax 
relief or other forms of state subsidy to private pensions, and the role of 
 
1 Measures to tackle the immediate crisis are discussed by OECD (2009) and are not the 
subject of this study. 
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the State Pension (formerly Old Age Pension). We provide new evidence 
on these issues using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, to analyse 
questions concerning the impact of changes in tax reliefs. SWITCH is 
based on data from the Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) EU Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2005.  
 
 The main focus of this study is an analysis of Irish data in order to add to 
the available evidence to inform policy choices. To begin, however, 
Chapter 2 undertakes a brief review of some key international pension 
studies, particularly those focusing on the impact of changes in financial 
incentives affecting choices regarding pension coverage and age at 
retirement. The recent and rapidly growing literature on non-financial 
factors influencing retirement savings is also considered. The implications 
of the findings of these different studies for policy design in Ireland are 
summarised. 
1.2  
Outline of 
the Study 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the framework used for the analysis. The starting 
point is the SWITCH model, based on the CSO’s EU SILC for 2005. We 
describe how the model was adapted for the present study, to take account 
of the rising proportion of elderly persons in the Irish population in the 
next 20 to 40 years. Chapter 4 considers how some long-run changes may 
affect the relative income position of the elderly. In particular, we examine 
the possible impact of the higher rates of pension coverage of current 
working age cohorts compared with those currently retired, which may 
affect the “at risk of poverty” rate for the elderly in future. Similarly, we 
consider the possible impact of higher rates of qualification for the State 
Contributory Pension2 in the future.  
 
The overall objectives of public policy on pensions are summarised in 
the Green Paper as providing an adequate basic standard of living through 
direct State support; and encouraging supplementary pension provision to 
provide an adequate replacement income. In this regard, the overall 
constraints on public finances mean that a key trade off is between the level 
of the State Pension and the extent of support provided for private 
(supplementary) provision. Support for supplementary pensions is, at 
present, mainly through tax relief on the superannuation contributions of 
employees and employers and the pension contributions of the self-
employed. Chapter 5 examines three critical questions posed in the Green 
Paper regarding this trade off in the design of retirement savings incentives. 
 
(a) Can tax incentives be better targeted to encourage improved 
coverage in a cost-effective way? 
 
(b) Should the over-riding principle be coverage or equity? 
 
(c) Should incentives be offered at the marginal, standard or a hybrid 
rate? 
 
 
2 The State Contributory Pension is paid to those aged 66 years or over and meeting 
conditions regarding social insurance contributions. Specifically, to qualify the person must 
have paid social insurance contributions before a certain age, have a certain number of 
social insurance contributions paid, and have a certain average number over the years since 
they first started to pay. Those not qualifying may be entitled to a State Non-contributory 
Pension, which is means-tested. 
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Issues to be examined in this context include: 
 
1. What would be the direct cost implications of alternative levels 
of tax relief (marginal rate versus standard rating)? In other 
words, what would be the impact effect on tax revenues if 
behaviour remained unchanged? 
 
2. What would be the direct implications of this on income 
distribution and the “at risk of poverty” measure? Here we 
would explore the rebalancing of tax relief, with resources 
generated being targeted through the social welfare system. 
Again, the analysis is undertaken on a “static” basis, with 
unchanged behaviour. 
 
Chapter 6 reviews the structure of the recently introduced “Pension-
Related Deduction” (PRD), more commonly known as the public service 
pension levy (PSPL). Should this levy be regarded as a pension 
contribution, a tax specific to the public sector, or a wage adjustment? This 
depends in part on the stated rationale for the levy, but also on its structure 
and impact which are carefully examined in this chapter. 
 
The main findings of the research are drawn together in the concluding 
chapter, along with some key issues for further investigation. 
2. PENSION 
INCENTIVES: SOME 
INTERNATIONAL 
EVIDENCE 
Our review of the international scene is necessarily selective – our aim is 
to highlight findings of particular relevance to the scope of this study. We 
begin, in Section 2.2, by looking at the UK Pensions Commission’s 
appraisal of the UK system and options for its reform (UK Pensions 
Commission, 2004 and 2005). Section 2.3 then reviews some key papers on 
the nature and strength of the responses to financial incentives for 
retirement savings in the UK and in the US, where extensive research on 
these issues has been conducted. Of course, many factors other than 
financial incentives influence retirement savings decisions. There has been 
a growing literature on how behavioural factors influence retirement 
savings, and how changes in the way savings and pension plans are 
structured can influence the degree to which they are taken up by different 
groups. Such studies are reviewed in Section 2.4. The main implications for 
Ireland are drawn together in the final section. 
2.1 
Introduction 
 
 Before examining the analysis of the UK Pensions Commission, it is 
helpful to summarise some of the key similarities and differences between 
the Irish and UK situations. The structure of the Irish pension system has 
much in common with that of the UK. (We base these comparisons on the 
UK system as of 2006, before the introduction of the most recent reforms.) 
The similarities include the following: 
2.2 
UK Pensions 
Commission 
 
• The broad structures of the pension systems are similar, with a 
social insurance based pension benefit, some means-tested 
benefits, and pensions from public sector employment funded 
on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. 
 
• In the UK, about one pensioner in four needed to claim the 
(means-tested) Guarantee Credit in order to attain the 
minimum income set by the state. The proportion of Irish 
4 
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pensioners in receipt of the means-tested non-contributory 
State Pension3 was similar. 
 
• Overall, in 2003, some 54 per cent of people in work were 
covered by an occupational or private pension in the UK. The 
corresponding figure for Ireland was 55 per cent in 2005. 
 
• In both countries, there has been a shift from the traditional 
defined benefit (DB) schemes, paying a pension which is a 
proportion of final salary, to defined contribution (DC) 
schemes, where the pension paid out in retirement depends on 
the amount paid in and the investment returns. Typically in the 
UK, and also in Ireland, the DC schemes have involved a lower 
employer contribution rate. 
 
There are, however, a number of important differences between the 
Irish context and policy environment and that of the UK: 
 
• The rate of payment for the UK’s State Pension, even when 
topped up with a Pension Credit, is substantially lower than 
Ireland’s – both in real terms and relative to average earnings.4 
 
• Correspondingly, in the UK, the proportion of pensioners “at 
risk of poverty” was between 21 per cent and 27 per cent 
during the decade to 2006-07. Latest figures, for 2006-07, 
indicate a rate of 23.2 per cent.5 Irish figures were over 40 per 
cent around the turn of the century, but the most recent 
estimate for Ireland (from CSO’s SILC 2006 data) is 13.6 per 
cent, reflecting higher State Pension payment rates. 
 
• While the sources of the demographic challenge (increasing 
longevity, declining fertility and relative decline in the working 
age cohort) are similar, there are differences in the timing. 
 
Given the many similarities in the UK and Irish situations, the reforms 
proposed by the UK Pensions Commission (and substantially adopted) are 
of particular interest. Three main areas for reform were highlighted (Hills, 
2006): 
 
1.  Introduction of a low cost, funded National Pension Savings 
Scheme with employees automatically enrolled into this or 
employer schemes which meet a good-quality criterion. While 
 
3 The State Non-Contributory Pension differs from the State Contributory Pension in that 
it is means tested. The contributory pension is not means tested and is paid to people age 
66 years or over who have paid sufficient social insurance contributions. Persons aged 
over 66 years who do not qualify for the contributory pension are eligible to receive the 
non-contributory pension subject to satisfaction of the means test. 
4 Currently, the UK Pension Credit guarantees an income (which may include a State 
Pension) of which, converted to a purchasing power equivalent in Ireland, approximates 
€160 per week, as compared with the personal rate for the Irish State Pension 
(Contributory) of €230 per week. 
5 This is the “before housing costs” figure, which is more comparable with CSO and ESRI 
analyses for Ireland. The “after housing costs” figure for the UK is 19 per cent. 
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enrolment would be automatic, there would be a right to opt out, 
or to make higher contributions. 
 
2.  The State Pension would become less means-tested and more 
universal than under unchanged policies. To finance this, there 
would be additional public spending on pensions and a rise in 
State Pension ages over the long run. 
 
3.  Measures to facilitate later retirement. 
 
Sefton et al. (2008) come to rather different conclusions about the 
potential role of means-testing in the UK State Ppension system. They use 
a dynamic programming model to consider the effects of a recent policy 
reform that reduced the marginal tax rates on private income associated 
with some means-tested retirement benefits from 100 per cent down to 40 
per cent. Their analysis suggests that this policy reform will encourage the 
poorest third of all households to both save more and delay retirement, and 
have the opposite effects on richer households. Overall their assessment is 
that the policy reform provides a reasonable compromise between the 
distortions associated with high marginal tax rates and the costs of 
universal benefits provision. 
 
 The US has had a number of major initiatives designed to increase 
pension coverage. Two of the most substantial are Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) and the 401(k) scheme.6 There has been a lively debate in 
the US concerning the extent to which such schemes add to national 
savings, or simply result in a reallocation of savings towards tax-preferred 
vehicles. 
2.3  
Pension 
Incentives: 
Evidence 
from the UK 
and the US 
 
Poterba, Venti and Wise (2001) note that there have been dramatic 
changes in retirement saving between 1980 and 2000. In 1980, 92 per cent 
of private retirement saving contributions were to employer-based plans 
and 65 per cent of those contributions were to defined benefit plans. By 
2000, about 85 per cent of private contributions were to plans in which 
individuals decide how much to contribute, how to invest the assets, and 
when to withdraw money from the plan. They conclude that …the enormous 
increase in defined contribution plan assets dwarfed any potential displacement of defined 
benefit plan assets. 
 
Gale and Orszag (2003) find that, despite the complexities involved in 
the contribution of tax breaks to the value of pension entitlements, there 
are clear patterns in terms of the distributional impact: 
 
High- income households are more likely to be covered by a pension. They 
are more likely to participate if they are eligible. The share of salary 
contributed, given participation, rises with earnings. And tax deferral is 
worth more to high-bracket than to low-bracket filers, a feature reinforced 
partly by the fact that high earners are likely to face a larger drop in 
marginal tax rates on retirement than are low earners. 
 
 
6 These are a type of employer-sponsored defined contribution retirement plan under 
section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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They argue that high income households are more likely to be saving 
adequately for retirement even without pension incentives, and are more 
likely to divert other savings into pensions rather than to increase their total 
savings. 
 
Why is participation so low among low-earners? One possibility is that 
their incomes may be too low to allow for saving. But as 60 per cent of 
households below the poverty line are found to make some savings, Gale 
and Orszag conclude that low income is far from a complete explanation 
for the low participation of low earners in pension plans. Furthermore, they 
note that a program which provided tax breaks and matching funds to 
encourage saving among participating low-income families (Sherraden, 
2001) suggests that poor families will save if presented with financial 
incentives to do so. Thus, they suggest that an alternative and perhaps 
more plausible explanation for low participation is that …tax incentives for 
retirement are meager for low-income households. Tax deferral means little to people 
whose tax rate is low or zero.  
 
A study by Benjamin (2003) has a number of features which improve on 
earlier estimates. In particular, it employs propensity score subclassification 
to control more completely for observed household characteristics, and 
controls for more household characteristics, including several correlated 
with unobserved savings preferences. He estimates that, on average, for 
every $4 increase in the amounts saved in 401(k) accounts, about $1 
represents an increase in national savings.7 He notes, however, that 
households who normally save the most were largely contributing funds 
they would have saved anyway.  
 
Recent UK reforms have offered new opportunities to analyse these 
issues. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) use three major UK pension 
reforms as “natural experiments” to investigate the relationship between 
accrual of entitlements under the state schemes, on the one hand (flate-rate 
Basic State Pension, BSP, and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme, 
SERPS) and discretionary private savings on the other. Their model uses 
both time-series and cross-sectional variation in a consistent way to identify 
the behavioural response. They find that changes in the earnings-related 
tier give rise to approximately offsetting changes in private savings, but that 
changes in the flat-rate tier of state support have no statistically significant 
effect on private savings. They conclude that reductions in state support 
for the earnings-related scheme would give rise to compensating increases 
in private saving; but that the same cannot be said for the basic State 
Pension. 
 
Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield (2004) review empirical evidence from 
the UK and the US – two of the countries most active in encouraging 
retirement savings through favourable tax treatment for particular savings 
accounts. They examine the extent to which funds in some specific tax 
advantaged accounts in both the US and the UK. As regards the Individual 
Retirement Accounts or IRAs in the US, they conduct analysis using panel 
data on households taken over four quarters. In the period 1982 to 1986, 
IRAs were made universally available and there were many new 
 
7 There is a bigger increase in private savings, but this is offset because of reductions in tax 
revenue due to the tax relief. 
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contributors. However, Attanasio et al., find that evidence on both savings 
rates and on consumption are …consistent with the hypothesis that the IRAs were 
ineffective in creating new savings.  
 
Similarly, Attanasio et al., use microdata from the British Household 
Panel Study and from the Family Resources Survey to examine whether the 
tax advantages provided by Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts 
(TESSA) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISA) stimulated savings in the 
UK. Again they find that there is little evidence of such an increase. Their 
overall conclusion is: 
 
The evidence presented in this paper for IRAs in the US, and TESSAs 
and ISAs in the UK, suggests that, at the most, only relatively small 
fractions of the funds going into tax-advantaged savings vehicles can be 
considered to be ‘new’ saving. As such, the best interpretation of the 
evidence is that such policies are expensive ways of encouraging savings. 
 
 While much of the focus in terms of increasing pension coverage has 
centred on the level and structure of tax incentives, there is now a 
substantial body of evidence to show that a number of other factors play 
important roles in determining whether or not an individual opts for a 
pension or other retirement savings plan. These factors include the 
structuring of the “default option”; the way in which options are framed; 
and the influence of peers and social context. Some of these factors can be 
altered by governments and/or employers and/or pension providers in 
ways which lead to an increase in pension coverage without an associated 
increase in the cost of financial incentives. In this sub-section we outline a 
selection of key papers on such topics, and draw out some of the 
implications of this growing field of research for the debate on pension 
policy in Ireland. 
2.4 
Behavioural 
Issues 
 
Standard economic theory would suggest that faced with a choice 
between enrolment in a pension plan or non-enrolment, individuals would 
make the same choice irrespective of which option (enrolment or not) was 
the default. The real economic benefits and costs are not influenced by 
which is the default option. But Choi et al. (2002) show that participation in 
a tax-preferred savings plan was significantly higher when participation was 
the default option. Findings of this type underpin the use of “automatic 
enrolment” as a default option in pension schemes, while allowing 
individuals to opt-out. The UK Pensions Commission’s proposals made 
use of this feature in their proposals for a “soft mandatory” pension 
scheme. 
 
Similarly, standard economic theory tends to focus on the net costs and 
benefits of different options: options with the same net benefit are 
regarded as equivalent to one another. But Duflo et al. (2005) found that a 
scheme known as Saver’s Credit, which effectively provided some matching 
support for retirement savings through the tax code, was less effective than 
a scheme which offered explicit matching funding. Their study was based 
on data from 14,000 individuals in low and middle-income 
neighbourhoods, If the behaviour of Irish taxpayers is similar, then what 
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has become known as an SSIA approach – offering an explicit “matching”8 
funding – may be more effective than the identical support provided 
through a tax reduction, at least for low and middle income earners. 
 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) describe a successful programme known as 
“Save More Tomorrow”. This required participants to commit in advance 
to saving a proportion of future salary increases as retirement savings. They 
find that a high proportion (close to 80 per cent) joined the plan, and the 
vast majority of those followed through on their commitment (through 4 
annual pay rises). The average savings rate for participants increased by 10 
percentage points (to 13.6 per cent) over a 40-month period. Here the key 
factor is the dynamics of the decision making. The individuals make a pre-
commitment regarding future salary increases. This leads to a substantial 
increase in savings over time. 
 
Duflo and Saez (2003) show how social influences can affect such 
decisions. They provided a small financial incentive to selected employees 
to attend an information session on tax-deferred savings schemes. Higher 
participation in the schemes was found among those who attended; and 
also increased, by just as much, for those in the same department as 
attendees. Lusardi et al. (2009) provide another example. They used a 
“social marketing approach” to develop a planning tool, given to 
employees at a not-for-profit institution to help with three key obstacles to 
saving: insufficient information on how to save, insufficient information on 
the amount of savings needed to open a savings account, and a perceived 
lack of control over the savings process. The intervention led to a 
substantial increase in enrolment in savings plans, and Lusardi et al., argue 
that there is scope for much wider application of their approach. 
 
 To what extent do tax incentives induce new savings for retirement and 
to what extent do they simply subsidise pension contributions which would 
have taken place in the absence of the incentive, or lead to a reallocation of 
savings towards the tax-favoured option, rather than a net increase in 
savings? Evidence on these issues is very limited for Ireland, but there are 
lessons to be learned from research in the US and the UK, where tax 
incentives for retirement saving have been much used, and the availability 
of suitable data has permitted extensive research. There are conflicting 
results in the US literature. Poterba, Venti and Wise (2001) found that 
policy changes encouraging Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) led to 
enormous increases in defined contribution plan assets, more than 
offsetting declines in defined benefit plans. However, these results are 
challenged by a number of other authors. Attanasio et al. (2004) examined 
the extent to which IRAs in the US, and Tax Exempt Special Savings 
Accounts (TESSA) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISA) in the UK 
represented new savings, and concluded that only small fractions of the 
amounts saved in these schemes represented new savings. They conclude 
that these policies have been an expensive means of encouraging saving, 
with large deadweight losses associated with the reshuffling of existing 
savings. Benjamin (2003) estimates that about half of the savings under the 
US scheme known as 401(k) represent new private savings, but only about 
2.5 
Implications 
for Ireland 
 
8 It should be noted that the matching need not be 1 for 1. In the case of the SSIA scheme 
it was €1 for €4 of savings in the scheme. 
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one-quarter represent new national savings. He notes, however, that 
households who normally save the most were largely contributing funds 
that they would have saved anyway. Taken together, these results suggest 
that tax incentives do face a substantial “deadweight” problem, of 
subsidising savings that would take place anyway; and that this is 
particularly so for those at higher incomes. This suggests that in the Irish 
context, restrictions on relief to top rate taxpayers may be advisable, and 
these are explored in Chapter 5. 
 
Financial incentives are far from the only factor influencing participation 
in pension schemes and retirement savings. A growing literature on 
behavioural factors influencing retirement savings decisions indicates that 
such elements as the default option faced by individuals; the way in which 
financial incentives are framed – explicit matching versus tax reductions; 
and social context can have important consequences for pension savings 
decisions. Some of these factors can be influenced by public policy, and by 
employers in ways which could boost pension coverage by more than 
increases in financial incentives, with their attendant costs. We return to 
this issue in the concluding chapter. 
3. FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we describe the framework used in our analysis. Following 
a short description of the SWITCH model (Section 3.2) we outline the way 
in which the model has been adapted to examine the implications of some 
long-term trends and of some policy choices in the context of the ageing of 
the Irish population over the next 20 to 40 years (Section 3.3). The 
measures of “at risk of poverty” used in the study are explained in Section 
3.4. Applications of the framework are then described in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.1 
Introduction 
 
 SWITCH is a tax-benefit model designed to calculate the income tax 
liabilities and social welfare entitlements of a nationally representative 
sample of households. The model can simulate welfare entitlements, 
income tax and employee PRSI under the actual rules for a particular year 
and under alternative policy rules of interest (e.g., potential future reforms). 
Policy options which can be analysed include changes to the personal and 
qualified adult rates of payment for different social welfare schemes, 
changes in the amounts paid as child dependant additions, and more 
structural reforms such as the introduction of a “Child Benefit 
Supplement”. On the tax side, the model allows for changes in tax rates, 
tax bands and tax credits. The implications can then be simulated for each 
tax unit in the sample, and the results analysed in terms of the impact on 
the distribution of income, or across family types, and the implications for 
“at risk of poverty” measures (described at the end of this chapter). 
3.2  
SWITCH, 
the ESRI 
Tax-benefit 
Model 
 
The model has been rebased to use data from the CSO’s 2005 Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC). We base our initial analysis 
on this year, and, as will be explained, look also at how these results would 
be affected by changes in the age structure of the population as projected 
for 2030 and 2050 by the ESRI’s Medium-Term Review (2008). It should be 
stressed that these are not fully-fledged analyses of scenarios for 2030 and 
2050; rather, they are analyses of the 2005 situation, with an adjustment to 
the population structure matching the 2030 or 2050 projection from the 
Medium-Term Review (2008). Some analyses are also undertaken which take 
account of policy changes up to 2008, to incorporate the fall in the “at risk 
of poverty” measures for older people seen in the 2006 SILC and as 
projected by the SWITCH model. 
 
For the present study, a key task was to construct variables measuring 
pension contributions so that various analyses of pension coverage and the 
tax treatment of pensions could be undertaken. EU SILC includes a 
number of items of information on pensions: 
11 
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• whether or not a pension contribution was made from the person’s 
last wage; 
 • the amount of contribution that was made; 
 • whether or not the person will be covered by a pension when they 
retire; 
 • who makes contributions to the pension that the person will 
receive; 
 • amounts paid to personal pension plans such as Retirement 
Annuity Contracts (RACs) and Personal Retirement Savings 
Accounts (PRSAs). 
 
We use a combination of these individual items to determine: 
 • whether or not a person is covered by a pension; 
 • the amount of employee contributions; 
 • the amount paid in respect of personal pension plans (RACs, 
PRSAs). 
 
For those who indicate that they make a contribution from their wage, 
but do not report the amount of the deduction, we assume a contribution 
of just under 5 per cent of gross salary – the average rate of contribution 
for those making a contribution. 
 
There is no direct information on the amount of contributions by 
employers. We have therefore imputed employer contributions, in the case 
where individuals are covered by an occupational pension, by assuming a 
total contribution by employer and employee of 15 per cent (i.e. the 
employer contribution is 15 per cent of gross income minus the percentage 
contribution made by the employee). First, we need to distinguish between 
public and private sector workers with limited data, our approach is as 
follows:  
 
• All those with a non-contributory pension scheme are assigned to 
the public service.  
 • If the industry code or occupation code indicates that an individual 
is in the public sector (e.g., civil service, defence, primary 
education) then he or she is categorised as a member of the public 
service pension scheme. 
 
While complete accuracy cannot be expected from these procedures, the 
aggregate numbers of public service pensioners identified in this way are 
broadly in line with available evidence on public service scheme 
membership. 
 
For private sector employers, a contribution is imputed at 15 per cent of 
gross salary, less the employee contribution. Thus, the total contribution 
for employees in the private sector is taken as 15 per cent. As pension 
contributions are a tax efficient way of rewarding employees, and 
particularly so for top rate taxpayers, it may be expected that total pension 
contribution rates will tend, on average, to rise with income. This is not 
taken into account in the present study. As a result, the concentration of 
pension benefits (and associated tax benefits) towards the top of the 
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income distribution is probably somewhat understated by the present 
analyses. 
 
The issues in the public sector are more complex, as the scheme is 
funded not on explicit contributions, but on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
However, in order to ensure an equitable treatment of private sector and 
public sector workers it would be necessary to attribute a value to the 
government’s implicit contribution. The rationale for this is explained more 
fully in Callan et al. (2007), and a similar point is also made by the Irish 
Association of Pension Funds IAPF (2008). The Report of the Public 
Service Benchmarking Body (2007) includes a special study on the relative 
value of public and private sector pensions. On the basis of this report, the 
Body took the view that A fair rate for the employer cost of the bulk of the public 
service is just over 20 per cent of salary. Here we assign an implicit employer 
contribution from the State of 20 per cent. The report of the 
Benchmarking Body indicates that, on average, employee contributions to 
public service schemes are close to 5½ per cent, making for an aggregate 
“contribution” of 25½ per cent.9 
 
The overall coverage rate estimated on this basis is somewhat lower 
than that as estimated from the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(QNHS) pension modules. It seems likely that this relates to the fact that 
information is obtained through proxy interviews for some individuals in 
EU SILC. A weighting adjustment was constructed to take account of this, 
so as to match the coverage rate from the QNHS.  
 
As a number of the questions posed in the Green Paper relate to the tax 
treatment of pensions, it is helpful to examine how SWITCH-based 
estimates of the “revenue foregone” by exempting pension contributions 
from income tax relate to official estimates produced by Revenue for the 
Green Paper. Table 3.1 summarises this comparison.10 It can be seen that, 
in aggregate, the SWITCH-based estimate of revenue foregone in 2005 is 
about 10 per cent lower than the Green Paper estimate for 2006. There is, 
however, a difference in the composition, with the official estimate 
showing a much greater revenue cost for personal pensions (retirement 
annuity contracts and PRSAs). Lower cost estimates for this item are offset 
in SWITCH by higher cost estimates for employer, and particularly 
employee contributions. It would not be expected that survey based 
estimates would exactly replicate the aggregates arrived at in the Green 
Paper, which was able to analyse administrative records. But the survey-
based data can provide answers to questions which are simply 
unanswerable from the administrative database, and the fact that the overall 
scale of tax relief is of a similar magnitude means that the results of 
SWITCH-based analyses are clearly relevant to current policy debate.  
 
9 For a change in the tax treatment of this aggregate contribution to gain effective revenue, 
the incidence of the change would effectively have to be on employees. While the 
structure of the recent Pension-Related Deduction (PRD or Public Service Pension Levy) 
does not operate in this way, the structure of the legislation suggests that this would be 
feasible. Chapter 6 deals in more detail with the nature of the PRD. 
10 It should be noted also that in comparison we have focused solely on the income tax 
revenue foregone – elements totalling €340 million relating to corporation tax and to 
employer and employee PRSI are identified separately in the Green Paper but are not 
included in the comparison undertaken here. 
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Table 3.1: Estimates of Revenue Foregone from Exemption of 
Superannuation/Pension Contributions, Official Sources and 
SWITCH Model 
 
 
Green Paper, 
Table 7.2  
(2006) 
SWITCH 
(2005) 
Employee Contributions 540 643 
Employer Contributions 510 544 
Personal Pensions 500 221 
Subtotal, Non-government Contributions 1,550 1,408 
Government Contributions n.a. 904 
Overall Total n.a. 2,312 
   
 
Before undertaking policy analysis on this database, it is informative to 
look at the distribution of pension coverage across income levels. Table 3.2 
shows that pension coverage is close to 20 per cent for the lowest 3 deciles 
of earnings, and then rises steadily with income to reach levels over 90 per 
cent for the top one-tenth of earnings. 
Table 3.2: Pension Coverage by Decile of Earnings 
  
Decile 
Pension Coverage Rate 
% 
Lowest 19.6 
2 17.6 
3 23.2 
4 34.1 
5 45.2 
6 55.2 
7 62.5 
8 74.5 
9 83.7 
Highest 94.2 
Overall Coverage 51.0 
  
Table 3.3: Pension Coverage by Decile of Earnings and Age Category 
 
 Age  
Deciles of income (all 
age groups) 
20-29 
Years 
30-44 
Years 
45-64 
Years Total 
1 13 33 15 20 
2 6 23 21 18 
3 9 29 33 23 
4 18 41 45 34 
5 25 52 62 45 
6 34 65 70 55 
7 38 66 74 63 
8 49 79 81 74 
9 58 87 86 84 
10 33 93 97 94 
Total 25 60 59 51 
     
 
Earnings tend to rise with age (and experience) and pension coverage 
also tends to rise with age. In order to examine the extent to which this 
overall association between earnings and pension coverage relates to these 
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factors, we examine the relationship between pension coverage and 
earnings deciles for three different age groups – 20 to 29 years, 30 to 44 
years and 45 to 64 years. The results are reported in Table 3.3. For each of 
the older age groups, 30 to 44 years and 45 to 64 years, the pattern is 
similar to the aggregate one. Pension coverage rates are low for those in the 
lower earnings deciles, and rise with income. For the youngest age group, 
lowest coverage is in the bottom half of the distribution, with coverage 
rising through upper earnings deciles. The exception is the top earnings 
decile, but the numbers of 20-29 year olds in this category are very small. 
 
 Our analysis goes beyond the usual framework for tax-benefit models, 
which is calibrated to the next budgetary year or a small number of years 
ahead. Instead, it is linked to demographic projections which take account 
of the expected rise in the ratio of people of pension age to the working 
age population (the Pensioner Support Ratio) over the medium to long 
term.11 
3.3  
Changes in 
Demographic 
Structure 
 
Table 3.4 shows the age distribution of the population as revealed by the 
most recent Census, and the projected age distributions of the population 
for 2030 and 2050, from the demographic model used in the Medium-Term 
Review (2008). 
Table 3.4: Age Distribution of the Population, Census 2006 and 
Projections for 2030 and 2050 
    
 Census 2006 
MTR Projection 
2030 
MTR Projection 
2050 
 000s 000s 000s 
 % % % 
Age less than 15 years 20.4 17.9 16.6 
Age 15 up to 24 years 14.9 12.6 10.2 
Aged 25 up to 44 years 31.7 23.5 23.4 
Aged 45 up to 64 years 21.9 27.8 22.0 
Aged 65 years or over 11.0 18.2 27.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
 
A sharp rise in the expected elderly population is evident. The total 
population is projected to rise from its 2006 level by 28 per cent up to 2030 
and by 40 per cent to 2050. A much faster growth is expected for those 
aged 65 years or over, where the number of elderly persons more than 
doubles to 2030, and will have more than trebled by 2050. As a proportion 
of the total population, those aged over 65 years are projected to rise from 
11 per cent in 2006 to 18 per cent in 2030 and 28 per cent in 2050. The 
SWITCH model has been extended to use estimated weights which take 
account of this demographic shift.  
 
 
11 With aggregate demographic projections, a common approach is to explore the 
sensitivity of results to alternative demographic assumptions. Our work breaks new 
ground in providing analyses based on a projected micro-database under scenarios for 
2030 and 2050. The issue of exploring sensitivity of results to alternative demographic 
assumptions is a challenging one for future research. 
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The overall target adopted in the National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion is framed in terms of “consistent poverty”12 – a measure 
designed to identify those who are suffering basic deprivation due to lack 
of resources. The measure currently used in the National Action Plan is 
based on individuals falling below 60 per cent of median disposable income 
(adjusted for family size and composition), and deprived of two or more 
items from a list of 11 basic necessities.13 At EU level, there is not, as yet, 
an officially agreed measure of poverty along the lines of Ireland’s 
consistent poverty measure. The EU has, however, agreed on a set of 
indicators14 for use in monitoring progress towards greater social inclusion. 
The most prominent of these measures is termed the “at risk of poverty” 
rate. It is simply the proportion of the population falling below certain 
proportions of median income – often termed the relative (income) 
poverty rate in the academic literature, or simply relative poverty. The EU’s 
use of the term “at risk of poverty” recognises that not all of those falling 
below such income cut-offs would be classed as “poor”. Ireland, like other 
EU countries, has agreed to the use of this measure to monitor progress. 
3.4 
Measures of 
Poverty 
 
In this study, we focus on the impact of demographic shifts and policy 
changes on the “at risk of poverty” measures, which depend simply on 
income information. SWITCH, like other tax-benefit models, can project 
and analyse cash changes in income. It is not currently feasible to project 
the impact of income changes on the deprivation levels of individual 
households, but work has begun on a study of the aggregate relationship 
between income changes and consistent poverty. 
 
In addition to this practical consideration, there are several reasons why 
the “at risk of poverty” is of interest. 
 
1. The National Anti-Poverty Strategy’s “poverty impact 
assessment” procedures play a key role in implementing the 
strategy. Under these procedures policy proposals are assessed 
not only to gauge their likely impact on poverty, but also their 
impact “…on inequalities which are likely to lead to poverty” 
(Office for Social Inclusion, 2006). The “at-risk-of-poverty” 
measure is clearly relevant in this context. 
 
 
2. While the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) targets are 
set in terms of the “consistent poverty” measure, there are 
commitments at EU level which relate to the EU “best 
practice” in terms of the “at risk of poverty” measures. 
 
 
3. More fundamentally, the “at risk of poverty” measures provide 
a way of measuring poverty which automatically ensure that 
poverty standards rise in line with real income growth. Most 
would agree that poverty standards of a century ago could no 
longer be used to define what constitutes poverty in present-
day society: it is not enough that the poor have experienced real 
 
12 The concept of consistent poverty was developed by Nolan and Whelan (1996) and 
adopted as the basis for measuring and monitoring poverty levels by the National Anti-
Poverty Strategy. 
13 For details see Whelan, Nolan and Maître (2006). 
14 These are termed the Laeken indicators, after the venue of the European Council 
meeting which agreed on them. 
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income gains over the past century (welcome though this is) if 
they have not got the resources to participate fully in 
contemporary society. A corollary of this is that poverty 
standards must also be adjusted over shorter periods of time. 
The “at risk of poverty” measure incorporates a clear and 
consistent approach to this issue.  
 
While the head count (or head count ratio, the proportion of persons 
with incomes below a poverty line) is the most common and easily 
understood of the “at risk of poverty” measures, this measure does have 
distinct drawbacks. A transfer of income from a very poor person to one 
who is just below the poverty line may reduce the head count of poverty, 
but only at the expense of deepening the poverty of the poorest person. 
Head counts of poverty can be very sensitive to the precise location of the 
income poverty line. This is more likely when there are large clusters of 
people with very similar incomes – such as the elderly, depending solely on 
public pensions. In order to allow for this, we use, in addition to the head 
count ratio, two other measures: 
 • the poverty gap ratio, which takes account of the depth of poverty, 
 • the weighted poverty gap ratio, which gives greater weight to 
persons with the lowest incomes. 
 
 We explore the direct impact of changes in the tax treatment of pensions 
using the SWITCH tax-benefit model. The model simulates the tax 
liabilities and benefit entitlements of a nationally representative sample of 
households – the data are drawn from the CSO’s Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU SILC) for 2005. A weighting scheme is used to 
adjust the data to represent the demographic situation in 2030 and 2050. 
All of the model results are based on the technical assumption of no 
change in behaviour. The fact that social welfare entitlements are 
incorporated in the model means that it is possible to analyse the direct 
impact of restrictions on income tax relief, coupled with an increase in 
social welfare pensions. These results could equally be interpreted in terms 
of changes in taxes helping to sustain existing levels of payment. 
3.5 
Conclusion 
4. DISTRIBUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF  
LONG-RUN CHANGES 
IN PENSION COVERAGE 
In this chapter we examine how the trade-offs facing policy are influenced 
by:  4.1 
Introduction  • rising rates of participation in occupational and private pension 
schemes (commonly referred to as “pension coverage”) the 
coverage of occupational/private pensions); 
 
• rising rates of qualification for the contributory State Pension 
 
 Occupational/private pension coverage among current pensioners is 
about 30 per cent, but stands at about 60 per cent for the over 30s.15This 
difference reflects the fact that the rate of pension coverage has been rising 
over time. If this higher rate of coverage is sustained or increased towards 
the 70 per cent target set in the National Pensions Review,16 then future 
pensioner populations will be more likely to have an entitlement to a 
private or occupational pension than the current cohort of pensioners. 
What implications would this have for the “at risk of poverty” measure for 
future pensioners?  
4.2  
Rising 
Pension 
Coverage and 
“At Risk of 
Poverty” 
Measures for 
Pensioners  
One approach to modelling the impact of a higher rate of pension 
coverage is to reweight the sample, giving greater weight to persons with a 
pension in payment. This is the approach implemented here. The estimated 
coverage rate based on SILC 2005 data is a little over 25 per cent - 
somewhat below the 30 per cent figure. We examine the implications of a 
rise in this coverage rate of 30 percentage points, to 55 per cent. We derive 
a weight which raises the proportion of pensions in payment for the over 
 
15 Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007). 
16 The National Pensions Policy Initiative (1996-1998) made recommendations for a fully 
developed pension system for Ireland. The National Pensions Review was carried out by 
the Pensions Board (at the request of the Minister for Social and Family Affairs) to 
examine pension coverage and associated issues and to assess the progress of pension 
provision since the implementation of the National Pensions Policy Initiatives 
recommendations between 2000 and 2003. 
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65 population by about 30 percentage points. Control totals for basic 
demographics (age distribution and number of households) are also 
imposed, based on the MTR projections to 2030 and 2050, summarised in 
Table 3.4. The procedure used to derive the new weights minimises 
changes from the initial weights.  
 
It should be noted that this procedure arrives at a higher number of 
pensioners with private pensions (including those from public service 
employment) by attributing a higher weight to pensioners currently with private 
pensions. This implies that the characteristics of the “additional” pensioners 
are similar to those of existing pensioners with private provision. The 
results must be interpreted in this light. Differences between “new” and 
“existing” pensioners cannot be taken into account under this approach.17 
Nevertheless, it provides a useful first estimate of the potential impact of 
increased pension coverage.  
Table 4.1: Potential Impact of Increased Pension Coverage on the “At 
Risk of Poverty” Measure 
 
 
Head Count 
Ratio 
Poverty 
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap 
Overall    
 
Baseline, 2005 20.0 4.47 1.96 
 
Adjusted for higher rate (55%) of 
pensions in payment for those over 
65 years 18.9 4.31 1.87 
 
Aged 65 Years or Over    
 
Baseline, 2005 25.9 1.67 0.25 
 
Adjusted for higher rate (55%) of 
pensions in payment for those over 
65 years 17.2 1.09 0.16 
    
Proportionate reduction in overall “at 
risk of poverty” indices -6% -4% -5% 
 
Proportionate reduction in “at risk of 
poverty” indices for those aged 65 
years or over -34% -35% -36% 
    
 
Table 4.1 summarises the estimated impact of a substantial rise in 
pension coverage on the “at risk of poverty” measures. As noted in 
Chapter 3, we use a set of three measures to assess changes in the risk of 
poverty: 
 
(a) the familiar head count ratio, representing the proportion of 
persons falling below the income threshold of 60 per cent of 
median income; 
 
(b) the poverty gap ratio, which takes into account, for each 
individual falling below the threshold, how far below the 
threshold their income is; 
 
 
17 For example, the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes, typically 
with lower rates of contribution, would tend to reduce the average value of pensions in 
future.  
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(c) the weighted poverty gap, which gives greater weight to the 
lowest incomes. 
 
The results suggest that for the population aged over 65 years all three 
measures fall by just over one-third, with the head count ratio falling by 9 
percentage points. Thus, the impact of increases in coverage of private 
pensions which has already happened can be expected to exert a significant 
downward influence on the “at risk of poverty” measures in the future. The 
impact of the change on the “at risk of poverty” measures for the overall 
population is more modest (proportionate falls of about 5 per cent) as the 
rise in pension incomes for those aged over 65 years tends to raise median 
income. 
 
 Coverage and eligibility for the State Contributory Pension have also 
been rising, with widening of the PRSI net, increased labour market 
participation, particularly by women, and special provisions for 
homemakers. In seeking to understand the implications of these changes, 
we are able to adopt a different modelling approach, which takes account 
of the differences between those currently receiving State Contributory 
Pensions, and those who will become entitled to such pensions in the 
future. We can decompose the impact of an increase in coverage of the 
State Contributory Pension into two components: 
4.3  
Impact of 
Increased 
Coverage of 
State 
Contributory 
Pension 
 
(a) First, increased coverage implies that the rate of payment for 
those moving from State Non-Contributory pensions would 
increase to the level of the State Contributory Pension. 
 
(b) Second, the State Contributory Pension is not means-tested. 
Thus, pensioners moving from non-contributory to contributory 
pension would see a further change in their circumstances, as 
there would be no reduction in payment associated with other 
incomes, such as occupational pensions. 
 
This approach is similar to making the State Contributory Pension a 
universal payment, dependent only upon age. As such, it goes somewhat 
beyond the actual changes to date, and gives an upper bound to the impact 
of these actual changes. 
 
We examine the impact of these two factors separately. Table 4.2 shows 
the potential distributive impact of an increase in the payment rate up to 
the level of the State Contributory Pension. Significant numbers of 
pensioners live as part of larger households. For this reason, we conduct 
this analysis at tax unit level, to give a clearer picture of the income 
distribution consequences of the policy change. Analysis of the “at risk of 
poverty” impact is, however, undertaken at household level, as this is the 
approach used in the measures of poverty and “at risk of poverty” by the 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy. Household level analysis also predominates 
in the academic literature on poverty measurement. The two approaches 
therefore provide complementary information on the income distribution 
and “at risk of poverty” consequences of policy changes. 
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Table 4.2: Potential Distributive impact of Increase in State Non-
Contributory Pension Payment Rate to the Level of the State 
Contributory Pension (Tax Unit Level) 
    
Decile % Gain 
Aggregate Net 
Gain 
€m p a 
Share of Aggregate Net 
Gain 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.1 1.1 1.0 
3 1.1 32.5 30.8 
4 1.8 59.8 56.6 
5 0.2 11.4 10.8 
6 0.0 0.7 0.6 
7 0.0 0.1 0.1 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 0.2 105.6 100.0 
    
 
The greatest proportionate gains are found not among the one-fifth of 
households with lowest incomes, but among the second from bottom 
ranked one-fifth of households. For this group – deciles 3 and 4 – 
disposable income increases by between 1 and 2 per cent. The estimate of 
the aggregate cost is aggregate cost is relatively modest, at about €105 
million. Close to 90 per cent of this amount goes to deciles 3 and 4, and 
almost none to the top half of the distribution.  
Table 4.3: Potential Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of an 
Increase in Payment Rate for State Non-Contributory Pension 
to the Level of the State Contributory Pension 
  
 Head 
Count 
Poverty 
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty Gap 
Overall    
 
2005 baseline 20.0 4.47 1.96 
 
Non-contributory pensions increased to 
same level as contributory pensions 18.4 4.38 1.95 
 
Elderly    
 
2005 baseline 25.9 1.67 0.25 
 
Non-contributory pensions increased to 
same level as contributory pensions 12.8 0.89 0.17 
    
Proportionate reduction in overall “at risk 
of poverty” indices -8% -2% -1% 
 
Proportionate reduction in “at risk of 
poverty” indices for those aged 65 or 
over -50% -47% -32% 
    
 
Table 4.3 shows estimates of the corresponding impact on the “at risk 
of poverty” measures, both for the overall population and for those aged 
65 years or over. The results for the overall population show a small fall in 
the head count ratio, but the other indices (poverty gap ratio and weighted 
poverty gap ratio) are almost unchanged. The impact on measures of “at 
risk of poverty” is much greater for those aged over 65 years. There is a 
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sharp fall in the “at risk of poverty” measures, with both the head count 
and the poverty gap ratio falling by close to half, and the weighted poverty 
gap falling by about one-third.  
 
On balance, it seems that this element of policy change – raising the rate 
of payment for non-contributory pensions to the level of the contributory 
pension – could lead to a significant fall in the “at risk of poverty” 
measures. While changes in economic circumstances have much reduced 
the room for manoeuvre in budgetary policy, it is worth noting that the 
cost of the change is modest compared to the size of budgetary welfare 
packages in recent years.  
 
We now turn to the implications of the other aspect of a shift from 
State Non-Contributory Pension to State Contributory Pension, arising 
from greater eligibility for the State Contributory Pension. This is the fact 
that the Contributory Pension is not means-tested, whereas the non-
contributory pension is means-tested. We analyse this by changing our 
modelling of the State Non-Contributory Pension to remove the means-
test. Table 4.4 shows that the overall cost is estimated at about €360 
million, and how this gain is distributed across tax units ranked from the 
poorest decile to the richest, based on income per adult equivalent. The 
greatest proportionate gains are in deciles 4 and 5, with gains of close to 2 
per cent. However, about half of the aggregate gain goes to the upper half 
of the income distribution.  
Table 4.4: Potential Distributive Impact of Abolition of Means-testing (to 
Approximate a Universal Entitlement to State Contributory 
Pension) Relative to a State Non-Contributory Pension 
Payment Rate at the Level of the State Contributory Pension, 
Retaining Means-testing 
    
Decile % Gain Aggregate Net Gain 
Share of Aggregate Net 
Gain 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.7 0.2 
3 0.7 22.0 6.1 
4 2.3 73.8 20.4 
5 1.7 82.0 22.7 
6 0.8 45.2 12.5 
7 0.8 55.9 15.5 
8 0.4 34.3 9.5 
9 0.3 29.8 8.2 
10 0.1 17.3 4.8 
Total 0.6 360.9 100.0 
    
 
Table 4.5 shows how the income gains from this policy affect the “at 
risk of poverty” measures. The results for the overall population show a 
small rise (1 percentage point) in the head count ratio, with a much greater 
increase (over 7 percentage points) in the head count ratio for people aged 
65 years or over. The poverty gap and weighted poverty gap increase only 
slightly. What drives this increase in the head count ratio for older people? 
The key factor is that there is an increase in the median income, as we have 
seen that incomes in this region were boosted by around 2 per cent. This 
reinforces the point that head count of poverty risk can be highly volatile, 
particularly for a group such as the elderly where incomes tend to be 
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clustered around the levels of the State Pension. In these circumstances a 
small change in median income can result in a substantial change in the 
headcount measure. Because of this it is important to complement the head 
count measure with measures which take account of how far households 
are from the relevant poverty line, such as the poverty gap index. 
Table 4.5: Potential Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of Abolition 
of Means-testing for Pensioners (See Note to Table) 
 
 Head Count Poverty Gap 
Weighted Poverty 
Gap 
Overall population    
Non-contributory pensions 
increased to same level as 
contributory pensions 18.4 4.40 1.95 
Means-testing of pensions 
abolished 19.5 4.48 1.99 
 
Elderly    
Non-contributory pensions 
increased to same level as 
contributory pensions 12.8 0.89 0.17 
 
Means-testing of pensions 
abolished 20.3 0.95 0.18 
    
Proportionate increase in 
overall “at risk of poverty” 
indices 6% 2% 2% 
 
Proportionate increase in “at 
risk of poverty” indices for 
those aged 65 years or 
over 59% 7% 6% 
    
Note: Analysis is undertaken relative to a baseline where the payment rate for State Non-
Contributory Pension is increased to same level as State Contributory Pension, and means-
testing is retained. 
 
Nevertheless, the main message is clear. A rise in the rate of non-
contributory pensions to the same level as the contributory pensions could 
significantly reduce the “at risk of poverty” measures for older persons – in 
both head count and poverty gap terms. Elimination of means-testing 
would, however, tend to spread benefits further up the income distribution, 
resulting in a rise in median income and would not lead to a reduction in 
the “at risk of poverty” measure. Indeed, it may lead to a rise in the “at risk 
of poverty” measure because the change leads to a rise in median income. 
 
As the key change under consideration is a shift from non-contributory 
to contributory pensions, via increased eligibility/coverage of the State 
Contributory Pension, both effects are knitted together. The overall impact 
on the “at risk of poverty” measures is summarised in Table 4.6 below. 
These results show very little change in the “at risk of poverty” measures 
for the overall population, but substantial reductions in these measures for 
the population aged 65 and over. 
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Table 4.6: Potential Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of Increased 
Coverage/Eligibility for State Contributory Pension 
 
 Head 
Count 
Poverty 
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty Gap 
Overall population 
   
2005 baseline 20.0 4.47 1.96 
Increased coverage of State 
Contributory Pension  19.5 4.48 1.99 
 
Elderly    
2005 baseline 25.9 1.67 0.25 
Increased coverage of State 
Contributory Pension  20.3 0.95 0.18 
    
Proportionate reduction in overall “at 
risk of poverty” indices -2.5% 0.2% 1.5% 
 
Proportionate reduction in “at risk of 
poverty” indices for those aged 65 or 
over -21.6% -43.1% -28.0% 
    
 
 Before analysing potential policy changes, we examine the potential 
impact of trends towards increasing coverage in occupational and private 
pensions, and in qualification rates for the Contributory State Pension. 
Occupational/private pension coverage among current pensioners is about 
30 per cent, but stands at about 60 per cent for the over 30s.18 This 
difference reflects the fact that the rate of pension coverage has been rising 
over time. If this higher rate of coverage is sustained then future pensioner 
populations will be more likely to have an entitlement to a private or 
occupational pension than the current cohort of pensioners. What 
implications would this have for the “at risk of poverty” measure for future 
pensioners? We estimate that this factor could reduce the “at risk of 
poverty” measure by about one-third – both in terms of the familiar head 
count ratio, but also in terms of broader measures taking account of the 
depth of poverty. In a similar fashion, we analyse the impact of increased 
rates of qualification for the Contributory State Pension. This factor could 
lead to a reduction in the head count of poverty of about one-fifth, and 
would also help to reduce the depth of poverty. 
4.4 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
18 Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007). 
5. ALTERNATIVE TAX 
TREATMENTS OF 
PENSIONS 
We now turn to a key area of pension policy: the appropriate tax 
treatment of pensions. In Section 5.2 we discuss some general issues 
relating to the tax treatment of pensions. We compare the current 
treatment (based on the principles of an expenditure tax, with pension 
contributions and pension fund income exempt from tax, and pensions in 
payment subject to tax) with some alternatives. Section 5.3 turns to some 
of the “questions for consideration” regarding tax incentives raised by the 
Green Paper, specifically raising the following issues: 
5.1 
Introduction 
 
(a) Can tax incentives be better targeted to encourage improved 
coverage in a more cost-effective way? 
 
(b) Should the over-riding principle be coverage or equity? 
 
(c) Should incentives be offered at the marginal, standard or a hybrid 
rate? 
 
In this chapter, we do not include the impact of the recently imposed 
public service pension levy or Pension Related Deduction. The nature of 
this deduction, and its interpretation, are taken up in Chapter 6. 
 
 Traditionally, the tax treatment of pensions is considered in a framework 
where there are three points at which pension-related incomes could be 
taxed: 
5.2  
Tax 
Treatments 
of Pensions 
 
• when contributions are made by those in employment or their 
employers; 
 • when investment income is earned (by the pension fund to which 
contributions are made); and 
 • when pensions are paid to those in retirement.  
 
The current tax treatment of pensions is based on a broad principle that 
initial contributions are exempt from tax (E), as is the investment income 
generated by the fund, and that payments to those in retirement are taxed 
(T). This is often referred to as an EET treatment of pensions (exempt, 
exempt, taxed). Lump sums paid at retirement are currently an exception to 
this rule as they are not subject to tax. As Whitehouse (1999) states, this is 
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equivalent to the “expenditure tax” of the public finance literature,19 while 
the “comprehensive income tax” would be represented by a system 
characterised as TTE (taxed, taxed, exempt) or ETT (exempt, taxed, taxed). 
 
However, the tax treatment of pensions needs to be seen against the 
broader background of the taxation of capital income. In a recent review of 
the base for direct taxation Banks and Diamond (2009) conclude that: 
 
The traditional tax base debate has been a competition between taxing 
income and taxing consumption expenditures. We argue that a better 
question is how to tax capital income, given that earnings are subject to 
tax, a question allowing a wider set of answers (Banks and Diamond, 
2009). 
 
Given that there will continue to be some progressive taxation of 
earnings, Banks and Diamond argue that: 
 
…a widely recognized result of the optimal tax literature – that capital 
income should not be taxed, in order that individuals’ choices regarding 
saving for future consumption are left undistorted relative to choices over 
immediate consumption – arises from considerations of individual 
behaviour and the nature of economic environments that are too restrictive 
when viewed in the context of both theoretical findings in richer models 
and the available empirical econometric evidence. Hence such a result 
should be considered not robust enough for applied policy purposes and 
there should be some role for including capital income as a component of 
the tax base. (Banks and Diamond, 2009). 
 
Banks and Diamond cite three main factors leading to the conclusion 
that the optimal tax system contains some form of capital income taxation: 
 
1. Evidence that those with the greatest earnings capacity are most 
willing and able to smooth consumption over their lifetime by 
saving; 
 
 
2. Econometric evidence suggesting that individuals with differing 
earnings capacities have differences in the shape of earnings 
profiles and demographic needs over the life-time; and 
 
 
3. Uncertainty about future earnings among young and middle-
aged individuals, which is likely to differ across individuals with 
differing earnings capacity. 
 
Some countries, notably those in Scandinavia, have moved towards a 
flat rate of tax on capital income, at a lower rate than taxes on labour 
income. Banks and Diamond, however, lean towards having some 
relationship between the marginal tax rates on labour income and those on 
capital income.  
 
 
19 The TEE regime is sometimes referred to as a “prepaid expenditure tax” system. It is 
the treatment afforded to savings under the UK’s ISA (Individual Savings Account) 
scheme.  
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What implications do these considerations have for the appropriate tax 
treatment of pensions in Ireland? There is no immediate prescription 
implied, but there are two clear messages. First, arguments about a choice 
between EET and TEE or other “pure” systems are not likely to be 
productive. Instead, Banks and Diamond focus on the fact that the optimal 
tax system is likely to include some taxation of capital income. Second, they 
argue that such taxation should bear some relationship to the marginal tax 
rates on labour income. In this context, we turn to one possible departure 
from the current system which is designed to take account of these 
marginal tax rate differences – standardisation of relief on pension 
contributions.  
 
 The Green Paper on Pensions (DSFA, 2007) specifically raised the issue of 
whether tax relief on pension contributions should be granted at a single 
rate of tax for all taxpayers, and if so whether this rate should be the 
standard rate of tax, the top rate of tax, or some intermediate “hybrid” rate. 
Some initial work on standard-rating of tax relief was undertaken in Callan 
et al. (2007). A package combining standard-rating and an increase in the 
basic State Pensions was examined. Here we extend this work to provide 
further evidence relevant to the assessment of standard-rating as against 
alternatives such as a hybrid rate of tax, or the granting of relief at the top 
rate to all taxpayers, as well as the current system of relief at the individual’s 
marginal rate of tax.  
5.3  
Standard-
Rating of 
Tax Relief on 
Pensions 
 
In the interim we may note that the UK has moved somewhat in this 
direction, limiting the tax relief available to high earners in the 2009 
Budget.20 Tax relief is available at the marginal rate for those with an 
income up to £150,000. Above that level, relief will be tapered away and 
those earning over £180,000 will only be able to claim the relief at the 
standard (20 per cent) rate of tax. There are some substantial exceptions. 
Those earning over £150,000 they will not be affected if: their overall 
annual pension savings are less than £20,000, or, for those with 
contributions in excess of that amount, if they continue with their normal 
pension savings. Thus, for existing contributors, the main change is that it 
removes the tax advantages associated with increasing pension 
contributions above the normal, for those with very high incomes. The 
high income limit means that relatively few individuals will be affected. The 
standardisation option examined here would have broader effects, and a 
more coherent rationale than the UK’s recent changes.  
 
Table 5.1 shows the potential impact of standardisation on aggregate 
revenue and its distribution across income classes. The revenue impact is of 
the “revenue foregone” type, with no allowance for changes in behaviour. 
On this basis, we estimate that in 2005 the potential increase in revenue 
would be about €1,100 million per annum. This is substantially below the 
earlier estimate of €1,500 million for three reasons: 
 
1. The weighting scheme used in this analysis does not make any 
adjustment to take account of the distribution of gross income 
as per the Reports of the Revenue Commissioners. As a result, 
 
20 In 2009, Irish policy also moved to limit relief on superannuation contributions for high 
earners, by lowering the cap on employee contribution relief to €150,000.  
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there is significant under-representation of higher incomes. The 
trade-off between this approach and calibration of the risk of 
elderly poverty was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2. The higher figure related to 2006, not 2005. 
 
 
3. The data source for the higher figure is the Living in Ireland 
Survey for 2000, uprated to 2006, and for the lower figure is the 
EU SILC 2005. 
 
Taking all three considerations into account, it seems likely that the true 
figure lies somewhere between the two estimates. 
 
The distributional implications are very similar to earlier estimates. 
Standardisation of tax relief on pensions has little or no impact on the 
bottom half of the income distribution. Over 80 per cent of the net losses 
are concentrated in the top two deciles, which would experience losses of 
close to 3 or 3½ per cent of disposable income. 
Table 5.1: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation of Tax Relief 
on All Pension Contributions, 2005 (Tax Unit Level) 
 
Decile 
% Change in 
Income 
 
Aggregate Gain/Loss 
€ million p. a. 
 
Share of Total Income 
Change 
% 
    
Bottom 0.0 0.3 0 
2 0.0 0.0 0 
3 0.0 0.0 0 
4 0.0 0.0 0 
5 -0.1 -3.0 0 
6 -0.5 -25.2 2 
7 -0.7 -51.6 5 
8 -1.5 -125.5 11 
9 -2.7 -281.0 26 
Top -3.5 -616.0 56 
All -1.8 -1,101.9 100 
    
 
How would these results be affected by changes in demographic 
structure? Tables 5.2 and 5.3 examine this issue, reweighting the analyses to 
arrive at the age structure of the population in 2030 and 2050 respectively. 
The first point to note is that the size of the potential revenue gain 
increases to around €1,500 million per annum under the 2030 demographic 
structure, falling back to €1,450 million when the age structure is adjusted 
to the projected 2050 situation. The distributional impact is very similar, 
irrespective of the age structure of the population. Again, over 80 per cent 
of the net losses in income are concentrated in the top two deciles, where 
income losses are between 2½ and 3½ per cent. 
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Table 5.2: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation of Tax Relief 
on all Pension Contributions, 2030 
    
Decile 
% Change in 
Income 
Aggregate 
Gain/Loss 
€ million p. a. 
Share of Total Income 
Change 
1 0.0 0.3 0 
2 0.0 0.0 0 
3 0.0 0.0 0 
4 0.0 0.0 0 
5 -0.1 -3.4 0 
6 -0.4 -30.5 2 
7 -0.8 -72.3 5 
8 -1.4 -166.5 11 
9 -2.6 -383.3 26 
10 -3.6 -842.9 56 
Total -1.8 -1,498.6 100 
    
 
Table 5.3: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation, 2050 
    
Decile 
% Change in 
Income € million p. a. 
Share of Total Income 
Change by Decile 
1 0.0 0.3 0 
2 0.0 0.0 0 
3 0.0 0.0 0 
4 0.0 0.0 0 
5 0.0 -2.9 0 
6 -0.3 -24.5 2 
7 -0.7 -69.0 5 
8 -1.4 -156.6 11 
9 -2.6 -371.5 26 
10 -3.5 -823.8 57 
Total -1.7 -1,448.1 100 
    
 
Next we examine packages which use some of the potential revenue 
gain to raise the level of the State Pensions (both contributory and non-
contributory). The packages are constructed as follows. First, we assume 
that the revenue available to finance the package is about two-thirds of the 
total potential revenue gain shown above. This is to allow for behavioural 
responses. Next we calculate the flat rate increase in State Pensions which 
can be financed by this revenue. Because the population aged 65 years or 
over rises sharply between 2005 and 2030, and again to 2050, the cost of 
each €1 on the State Pension rate increases substantially. As a result, the 
pension increases which can be financed in this way are estimated at 
 
• €38 in 2005 
• €25 in 2030 
• €15 in 2050 
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STANDARD-RATING AND INCREASED PENSION RATES: 
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
We now examine estimates of the distributive impact of these packages 
and follow this with an analysis of the impact on “at risk of poverty” 
measures. 
Table 5.4: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation and €38 
Increase in State Pension Rates, 2005 (Household Basis) 
 
Decile 
% Change in 
Income € million p. a. 
Share of Net Gains/Losses 
of Deciles Gaining/Losing 
% 
    
Bottom 0.6 10.8 2 
2 6.4 160.1 27 
3 10.0 264.8 45 
4 3.3 122.8 21 
5 0.5 26.4 5 
6 -0.3 -18.7 2 
7 -0.8 -58.1 6 
8 -1.7 -137.6 14 
9 -3.1 -299.9 32 
Top -3.1 -435.6 46 
All -0.6 -365.0  
    
 
Results for 2005 indicate that gains are concentrated in deciles 2, 3 and 
4, with the greatest gains for the third decile. Net losses are heavily 
concentrated (almost 80 per cent) in the top two deciles. 
Table 5.5: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation and €25 
Increase in State Pension Rates, Age Structure as Projected 
for 2030 (Household Basis) 
 
Decile 
% Change in 
Income € million p. a. 
Share of Net Gains/Losses 
of Deciles Gaining/Losing 
% 
    
Bottom 0.7 20.2 3 
2 5.8 197.1 25 
3 8.2 286.7 36 
4 4.5 231.8 29 
5 0.8 51.9 7 
6 0.0 1.4 0 
7 -0.8 -81.3 6 
8 -1.4 -168.5 13 
9 -2.7 -391.0 30 
Top -3.1 -653.6 50 
All -0.6 -505.3  
    
 
Distributional impacts based on an age structure as projected for 2030 
show quite a similar pattern. Proportionate gains are between 5 and 8 per 
cent for deciles 2, 3 and 4, which account for most of the net gains. The 
top two deciles again account for about 80 per cent of the losses. 
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Table 5.6: Estimated Distributive Impact of Standardisation and €15 
Increase in State Pension Rates, Age Structure as Projected 
for 2050 (Household Basis) 
 
Decile 
% Change in 
Income € million p. a. 
Share of Net Gains/Losses 
of Deciles Gaining/Losing 
% 
    
Bottom 0.9 34.1 4 
2 4.5 167.2 22 
3 5.7 215.9 28 
4 4.5 219.0 29 
5 1.6 103.9 14 
6 0.2 18.5 2 
7 -0.4 -45.9 4 
8 -1.1 -146.3 11 
9 -2.3 -347.8 27 
Top -3.1 -736.0 58 
All -0.5 -517.4  
    
 
The distributional impact based on an age structure for 2050 (as 
projected by the Medium-Term Review (2008) is again quite similar. Gains are 
concentrated in deciles 2, 3 and 4 and losses in the top two deciles. One 
difference is, however, that with the smaller increase in the State Pension, 
the proportionate gain for the third decile falls to under 6 per cent, as 
compared with 10 per cent in 2005 and just over 8 per cent in 2030. 
STANDARD-RATING AND INCREASED PENSION RATES: 
IMPACT ON THE “AT RISK OF POVERTY” MEASURE 
Next we turn to the impact of standard-rating tax reliefs and raising the 
State Pension on “at risk of poverty” measures. Table 5.7 shows the results 
of analysis for the 2005 package, an increase of €38 per week in the State 
Pension, financed by standard-rating the relief on pension contributions. 
The head count ratio of “at risk of poverty” falls by about 90 per cent, 
while the poverty gap ratio falls by about 80 per cent. The head count ratio 
is estimated to fall from 17 per cent to about 3 per cent. On a static basis, 
without changes in behaviour, the proportion of the population deemed “at 
risk of poverty” would fall to very low levels. 
 
How are these results affected by the ageing of the population? Tables 
5.8 and 5.9 show the corresponding results when adjusted for the age 
structures as projected for 2030 and 2050. Again, there are substantial 
impacts on the “at risk of poverty measures”. The head count measure is 
reduced by about 80 per cent in each case. The poverty gap is reduced by 
67 per cent under the 2030 demographic structure, and by 58 per cent 
under the 2050 demographic structure. 
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Table 5.7: Estimated Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of 
Standardisation and €38 Increase in State Pension Rates, 2005 
(Household Basis) 
 
Overall 
Head Count 
Ratio 
Poverty 
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty Gap 
 
Baseline, 2005 20.0 4.47 1.96 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €38 17.1 4.29 1.94 
 
Aged 65 years or over    
 
Baseline, 2005 25.9 1.67 0.25 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €38 2.8 0.36 0.10 
    
 
Reduction in overall risk of 
poverty -14%        -4%         -1% 
 
Reduction in risk of poverty for 
those aged 65 or over -89%       -78%        -60% 
    
Table 5.8: Estimated Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of 
Standardisation and €25 Increase in State Pension Rates, 2030 
(Household Basis) 
 
 
Head Count 
Ratio 
Poverty  
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty Gap 
 
All    
 
Baseline, 2005 policy with 2030 
age structure 18.5 3.80 1.63 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €25 14.9 3.59 1.60 
 
Aged 65 years or over    
 
Baseline, 2005 policy with 2030 
age structure 21.3 1.20 0.20 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €25 3.4 0.40 0.11 
    
 
Reduction in overall risk of 
poverty -19%         -6%          -2% 
 
Reduction in risk of poverty for 
those aged 65 years or over -84%       -67%        -45% 
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Table 5.9: Estimated Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of 
Standardisation and €15 Increase in State Pension Rates, 2050 
(Household Basis) 
     
 
Head 
Count 
Ratio 
Poverty 
Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap 
Median 
Income 
All     
 
Baseline, 2005 policy with 2050 
age structure 18.5 3.80 1.63 337.13 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €15 15.2 3.60 1.60 334.89 
 
Aged 65 years or over     
 
Baseline, 2005 policy with 2050 
age structure 21.3 1.20 0.20 337.13 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €15 4.7 0.51 0.13 334.89 
     
 
Reduction in overall risk of 
poverty  -18%     -5%       -2%  
 
Reduction in risk of poverty for 
those aged 65 years or over -78%   -58%      -35%  
     
 
It should be noted, however, that there has been a significant reduction 
in the “at risk of poverty” measures for older people as between 2005 and 
2007, according to the EU SILC. (Latest results at time of writing are for 
2007.) Furthermore, special increases in State Pension rates between 2006 
and 2008 could be expected to have led to further reduction in the risk of 
poverty. In order to assess how this might affect the impact of the 
standard-rating plus pension increase package, we have estimated the 
impact of the change using a database and policy parameters updated to 
2008 levels. 
 
A key point here is that the baseline estimate of the “at risk of poverty” 
headcount ratio is 9 per cent. SILC indicates a fall in this measure from 
20.1 per cent in 2005 to 13.6 per cent in 2006 –  taking the rate from above 
the overall risk to significantly below the overall risk. This estimate for 
2008 should not be taken as precisely comparable to these figures, but 
suggests that special increases in pension payment rates may have reduced 
this risk further. The standard-rating and pension increase package still 
eliminates high proportions of the “at risk of poverty” head count. Again, 
this also extends to the poverty gap, which takes account of the depth of 
poverty, and the weighted poverty gap, which gives greatest weight to those 
with lowest incomes. It should be noted, however, that in this case (as in 
the CSO SILC results for 2006) the “at risk of poverty” rate for the elderly 
is already below the rate for the whole population. 
 
 
 
 
34 PENSION POLICY: NEW EVIDENCE ON KEY ISSUES 
Table 5.10: Estimated Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Measures of 
Standardisation and €38 Increase in State Pension Rates, 
2008 (Household Basis) 
 
 
Head Count 
Ratio Poverty Gap 
Weighted 
Poverty Gap 
All    
 
Baseline, 2008  15.3 3.56 1.66 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €38 14.2 3.45 1.63 
 
Aged 65 years or over    
 
Baseline, 2008  9.0 0.49 0.08 
 
Tax relief on all pension 
contributions at the standard 
rate, and State Pensions 
increased by €38 1.4 0.15 0.04 
    
Reduction in overall risk of 
poverty -7% -3% -2% 
 
Reduction in risk of poverty for 
those aged 65 years or over -85% -69% -50% 
    
 
 What if the tax relief on pensions were standardised at a different rate – 
either the top rate of tax, or some hybrid rate falling between the standard 
rate and the top rate? We examine each of these options in turn. We restrict 
our attention to the 2005 situation, as findings based on the age structures 
for other years are rather similar. 
5.4  
Tax Relief on 
Pensions a 
Single, 
Hybrid Rate  Table 5.11: Estimated Distributive Impact of Tax Relief at Top Tax Rate 
(Tax Unit Basis) 
    
Decile % Gain 
Aggregate Net 
Gain/Loss 
Share of Aggregate 
Gain 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.2 0.1 
4 0.0 1.1 0.5 
5 0.2 11.4 5.5 
6 0.7 38.1 18.4 
7 0.8 58.6 28.3 
8 0.8 66.7 32.2 
9 0.3 28.6 13.8 
10 0.0 2.9 1.4 
Total 0.3 207.2 100.0 
    
 
Table 5.11 shows the cost and distributive impact of standardising tax 
relief at the top rate of tax for 2005. The overall cost, again a static 
estimate, is close to €210 million. However, one of the aims of such a 
policy would be to encourage pension savings by those not already 
covered, and increased contributions from those (standard-rate) taxpayers 
whose contributions are currently low. To the extent that such increases in 
contributions are forthcoming, the cost would rise, and there would be 
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further gains for standard rate taxpayers. On a static basis, the greatest 
proportionate gains are for deciles 6, 7 and 8, at around ¾ of 1 per cent. 
These deciles account for almost 80 per cent of the aggregate gain, and 
over 90 per cent when the 9th decile is included. 
Table 5.12: Estimated Distributive Impact of Tax Relief at Hybrid 30 Per 
Cent Rate (Tax Unit Basis) 
       
Decile % Gain 
Aggregate 
Net 
Gain/Loss 
Gross 
Loss 
Gross 
Gain 
Share of 
Gross 
Loss 
Share of 
Gross Gain 
1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
4 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 
5 0.1 4.3 0.8 5.0 0.1 6.1 
6 0.1 5.5 12.7 18.2 2.2 22.2 
7 0.0 -0.6 25.7 25.1 4.4 30.8 
8 -0.4 -37.1 60.8 23.7 10.4 29.1 
9 -1.3 -140.0 147.6 7.6 25.3 9.4 
10 -1.9 -334.0 335.3 1.3 57.5 1.6 
Total -0.8 -501.3 583.0 81.6 100.0 100.0 
       
 
Table 5.12 shows the estimated impact effect of standardising tax relief 
on pension contributions at 30 per cent, a “hybrid” rate. This implies gains 
for standard-rate taxpayers, and losses for top rate taxpayers. Our estimates 
suggest that, on a static basis, there would be a net gain in revenue of about 
€500 million per annum. About 80 per cent of the total gain would be 
concentrated in deciles 6 to 8, but there are also significant losses in these 
deciles, outweighing the gains in deciles 7 and 8. About 80 per cent of the 
total losses would be in the top 2 deciles, where incomes fall by 1 to 2 per 
cent. A key question is how the incipient revenue gain would be allocated. 
Table 5.13: Distributive Impact of Standardisation at Hybrid 30 Per Cent 
Tax Rate Versus Standardisation at Standard Rate of Tax 
    
Decile % Gain 
Aggregate Net 
Gain 
Share of Aggregate 
Net Gain 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.1 0.0 
4 0.0 0.5 0.1 
5 0.2 8.1 1.3 
6 0.6 31.7 5.3 
7 0.8 52.4 8.7 
8 1.2 97.8 16.3 
9 1.4 140.9 23.4 
10 1.6 269.4 44.8 
Total 1.0 600.9 100.0 
    
 
An alternative perspective is provided by Table 5.13, looking at the 
impact of moving from standardisation at the standard rate of tax to 
standardisation at a hybrid, 30 per cent rate. When compared with 
standardisation of reliefs at the standard rate, we see that a hybrid rate of 
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30 per cent leads to more than two-thirds of the total benefit flowing to the 
top two deciles. There are little or no gains for the bottom half of the 
income distribution, and the proportionate gain for the top two deciles is 
about 1½ per cent. It is true that the incentive to join a pension scheme is 
increased, but the evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that a greater 
increase in coverage of pensions may be obtained at lesser cost, and 
without the spillover to high income earners, through schemes which 
address the behavioural issues involved. 
 
 Debate about the appropriate tax base has, in the past, often been 
characterised as a contest between an income base and an expenditure base. 
Banks and Diamond’s (2009) recent major review of the base for direct 
taxation comes to the conclusion that a more productive question is how to 
tax capital income, given that earnings are subject to tax. They conclude 
that the optimal tax system contains some form of taxation of capital 
income.21  
5.5 
Conclusion  
 
In this context we examined some possible changes to the current tax 
treatment of pensions, which can be characterised as following expenditure 
tax lines, while most direct taxes operate using income as a base. One 
alternative is that relief on contributions could be restricted to the standard 
rate of tax. This would imply a reduction in income tax relief for top rate 
taxpayers, but no change for those paying the standard rate. Our main 
findings include the following: 
 
• Standardisation of relief on all pension contributions (employee, 
employer and implicit government contributions) could raise 
revenue of over €1,000 million per annum. 
 • More than four-fifths of the revenue raised would come from the 
richest one-fifth of tax units. 
 • Revenue raised could be applied to sustaining State Pension levels 
as demographic pressures on the financing of public pensions 
intensify. 
 • Relative to the current situation, standardising relief at a hybrid, 30 
per cent rate, as recommended by the Commission on Taxation, 
would lead to losses for top rate taxpayers, and gains for standard 
rate taxpayers. 
 • Relative to a relief standardised at the standard rate of income tax, 
allowing relief at the hybrid, 30 per cent rate recommended by the 
Commission on Taxation would lead to gains heavily concentrated 
(more than two-thirds) on the top one-fifth of tax units. 
 
In the light of these findings, we return to the key questions posed by 
the Green Paper: 
 
o  Can tax incentives be better targeted to encourage 
improved coverage in a cost-effective way? 
 
21Banks and Diamond argue that the finding in earlier optimal tax research that capital 
income should not be taxed arose from models which failed to capture important features 
of individual behaviour and the economic environment, and that richer models and 
empirical results suggest that capital taxation is part of the optimal mix. 
   ALTERNATIVE TAX TREATMENTS OF PENSIONS 37 
 
o  Should the overriding principle be coverage or 
equity? 
 
o  Should incentives be offered at the marginal, 
standard or a hybrid rate? 
 
What does the evidence gathered and reviewed in this report say about 
these interlinked questions? Our reading of the evidence is that tax 
incentives can be better targeted, by allowing relief at the standard rate of 
tax or at a hybrid rate close to that rate. This is because, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, UK and US studies indicate there is significant deadweight 
associated with tax incentives for pensions, particularly among those in 
higher income groups. In terms of the coverage versus equity trade-off, 
resources raised by standardisation could contribute towards the financing 
of the State Pensions, which will come under pressure from population 
ageing. Furthermore, we think that a key feature is that the coverage versus 
equity trade-off can be improved by extending the range of policy 
instruments beyond tax incentives, drawing on behavioural economics to 
design schemes which will encourage enrolment into pension plans.22 Such 
plans could include not only privately managed schemes but also new 
publicly managed defined contribution schemes, to take advantage of low-
cost asset management by NTMA or NPRF, as recommended by McHale 
(2005), the Commission on Taxation (2009) and by Lane (2009).  
 
 
22 Again, these are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
6. THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
PENSION LEVY (2009) 
A “pension related deduction” affecting public service employees was 
introduced with effect from March 2009. It is commonly known as the 
public service pension levy. We will use terms pension-related deduction 
(PRD) and public service pension levy (PSPL) interchangeably, reflecting 
what are, respectively, the official and the most commonly used names for 
the deduction. Persons covered by the deduction are those defined as being 
a “public servant”. A public servant is defined as: 
6.1 
Introduction 
 
• a person who is employed by, or who holds any office or other 
position in, a public service body, 
 • a member of either House of the Oireachtas or of a local authority,  
 • a member of the European Parliament for a constituency in the 
State, or 
 • the holder of a qualifying office. 
 
The Act defines a ‘‘public service body’’ as 
…the Civil Service, the Garda Síochana, the Permanent Defence Force, 
local authorities, the Health Service Executive, the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland, vocational educational 
committees, primary and secondary schools, third-level institutions, and 
the non-commercial semi-state bodies where a public service pension 
scheme exists or may be made. 
Commercial state-sponsored bodies are excluded from the 
ambit of the levy. 
 
The legislation also states that for the Pension-Related Deduction to 
apply, a public servant must: 
 
• be a member of a public service pension scheme or, 
 • be entitled to a benefit under such a scheme or, 
 • receive a payment in lieu of membership in such a scheme. 
 
A public servant who is not a member of a public service pension 
scheme, as defined in the legislation, or entitled to a benefit under a scheme 
or in receipt of a payment in lieu of membership of such a scheme would 
not be subject to the deduction. The Department’s website states that It is 
not anticipated that there will be many public servants falling into this category and the 
parent Department should be consulted if there is a doubt. 
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The levy is calculated on all remuneration including overtime, ‘acting up’ 
allowances (paid if a person of a lower grade carries out the duties of a 
higher grade staff member) and benefit-in-kind. As the levy is being treated 
as a pension contribution, tax relief is provided at the marginal rate but the 
legislation provides that the levy will not affect the overall threshold levels 
for tax relief on pension contributions.  
 
The rates of the deduction in the initial 2009 budget were: 
 
• 3 per cent on the first €15,000 of income. 
 • 6 per cent on the next €5,000. 
 • 10 per cent on earnings in excess of €20,000. 
 
The supplementary budget (April, 2009) amended these rates to reduce 
the impact of the PSPL on lower paid public servants making the first 
€15,000 of earnings exempt from the levy. The rates now stand at: 
 
• 5 per cent on earnings between €15,000 and €20,000. 
 • 10 per cent on earnings between €20,000 and €60,000. 
 • 10.5 per cent on earnings in excess of €60,000. 
 
 The Public Service Pension Levy could be characterised in terms of its 
stated intentions (as, for example, in the preamble to the act or the debates 
surrounding its introduction) or, perhaps more usefully, in terms of its key 
characteristics. These include elements of a pension contribution, a wage 
cut, and a tax. We consider each of these in turn, but first it is useful to 
state some key features of the PRD which must be taken into account in its 
interpretation, and in particular, how it relates to a pay cut. 
6.2 
Interpreting 
the “Pension 
Related 
Deduction” 
 
1. The PRD has no impact on the incomes of current recipients 
of public service pensions. By contrast a pay cut would lead to a 
reduction in pensioner incomes if the “pay parity” provisions 
were applied to reductions as well as to increases in current 
public service pay. 
 
 
2. The PRD reduces the take-home pay of current public service 
employees falling within its scope – so too would a pay cut. The 
pattern of reductions is considered in Section 6.3 below. 
 
 
3. The PRD does not reduce the future pension incomes of 
current public service employees – their pension entitlements 
are calculated with respect to their gross pensionable pay, which 
is not affected by the PRD. A pay cut would reduce the future 
incomes of public service pensioners. A pay cut would reduce 
both current and future pension income; but the PRD reduces 
current take-home pay but not future pay – increasing the 
incentive to retire early, even before the special measures also 
announced with this intention. 
 
Should the Pension Related Deduction (PRD) be thought of as a 
pension contribution? Some of the points made in the preamble to the Act 
introducing this measure suggest such an interpretation, notably the 
remarks that …the value of public service pensions is significantly and markedly more 
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favourable than those generally available in other employment. But when considering 
the deduction as it actually operates, there are conflicting considerations on 
this point. On the one hand, the PRD is treated as a pension contribution 
from the point of view of income tax and PRSI – the pension related 
deduction is excluded from income for tax/PRSI purposes as the same way 
as employee contributions to pension schemes or to PRSAs. On the other 
hand, it is not counted as a contribution in terms of the limits (as a 
proportion of income) on employee contributions to superannuation 
schemes. Furthermore, and perhaps most tellingly, the PRD payments are 
pooled with general tax revenues, and the payments of pensions are 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Thus, the link between the PRD and 
pension benefits is very weak. However, this might also be said of 
employee pension contributions within the public service more generally. 
Under the current public service pension “model scheme”,23 employees 
make contributions of 1½ per cent of gross reckonable pay, and 3½ per 
cent of net reckonable pay (i.e., gross pay less twice the payment rate for 
the contributory State Pension); a further contribution of 1½ per cent is 
also payable as part of the spouse’s and children’s pension scheme.24 Staff 
employed after 1995 pay full PRSI and qualify for the State Contributory 
Pension, but their occupational pension is reduced by a formula linked to 
the individual rate of State Contributory Pension. 
 
The “integration” provision means that those on low pay, or working 
part-time, and covered by the current public service pension scheme, may 
find little net benefit from their contributions.25 Initially, for the period 
1995-2004, this is because the size of the pension to which they may 
become entitled is no larger, or not much larger, than the social welfare 
pension for which they qualify – which, in an integrated scheme, is set 
against their entitlement to an occupational pension.26 From 2004 onwards 
the scheme was changed to provide somewhat better terms for those on 
low pay, but the issue still remains and gains renewed relevance with the 
introduction of the Pension-Related Deduction. 
 
The Pension-Related Deduction also has some characteristics of a tax 
policy. The aims of the PRD include raising revenue to finance government 
expenditure. The preamble states that as a consequence of the economic 
decline, …a serious deterioration in the revenues of the State has occurred and there are 
significant and increasing Exchequer commitments in respect of public service pensions. 
The nominal rate schedule of the PRD is progressive, in an attempt to 
reflect ability to pay considerations – another key feature of taxes. As we 
 
23 For those whose employment began prior to 1 April 1995, the main pension scheme is 
non-contributory, though a contribution of 1½ per cent for the spouse’s and children’s 
scheme is required. 
24 Those employed before 1995 faced, and continue to face, a different regime. The main 
pension scheme is non-contributory, the only employee contribution being for Spouse’s 
and Children (1½ per cent). Also pre-1995 civil servants paid a lower, modified rate of 
PRSI which did not qualify them for the State Contributory Pension. After 1995, full PRSI 
was payable, and salary scales were increased to maintain incomes at the pre-1995 level.  
25 There can also be issues arising from differential benefits for contributions where staff 
are on full versus modified PRSI rates. 
26 A further consideration is that liability to PRD is the same irrespective of whether an 
individual public servant is paying full or modified PRSI. This contrasts with pre-existing 
rates of employee contribution which are differentiated on the basis of PRSI status. 
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shall see, the effective rate schedule, when account is taken of the 
adjustments to income tax is somewhat more complex. 
While the public sector pension levy has aspects of both pension 
contributions and a tax, it can perhaps best be interpreted as a means of 
achieving a reduction in Exchequer pay costs by means other than a simple 
pay cut. The preamble to the Act notes that:  
 
…it is necessary to cut current Exchequer spending substantially to 
demonstrate to the international financial markets that public 
expenditure is being significantly controlled so as to ensure continued 
access to international funding, and to protect the State’s credit rating 
and reverse the erosion of the State’s international competitiveness… 
 
A report of the EU Commission (EU Commission Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009) states that:  
 
The national authorities regard the so-called 'pension levy' on wages paid 
by public service bodies as an expenditure-reducing measure, as effectively 
it is a pay cut for public servants without changing their pension 
entitlements. 
 
Treated as a pay cut, a key feature is that it is not a flat percentage across 
the board, but is structured to place a higher proportionate burden on 
those with higher incomes. It is certainly true that this is a legitimate goal of 
public policy; it is less clear whether this is a goal best tackled through an 
instrument such as a public sector pension levy. The general goal of 
support for low incomes, or limiting equality of income, is typically 
assigned to the tax and welfare systems. Market forces can then be allowed 
to determine wages, in order to ensure the efficient operation of the labour 
market. Of course, the market for some occupations is strongly influenced 
or determined by the public sector. It could be argued that this may lead to 
public sector premia which are out of line with productivity related 
characteristics. Could the progressive structure of the PRD be helping to 
offset inappropriate public sector premia? Kelly et al. (2009) provide recent 
evidence on the pattern of public sector pay premia. Their analysis 
adjusting for factors such as age and educational qualifications which are 
known to influence wages, finds that public sector premia are higher for 
those at low wage levels, and small or negligible for those on high wage 
levels. This would suggest that, from a labour market point of view, 
reductions targeted specifically at the top would not be warranted. 
 
 We provide two perspectives on the impact of the Pension-Related 
Deduction. 6.3 
Impact of the 
“Pension-
Related 
Deduction” 
 
• First, we consider how the PRD, as implemented in the 
Supplementary Budget of April 2009, affects the net incomes of a 
one-earner married couple at different income levels. We compare 
this with the alternative of a flat-rate levy, and of a wage cut, to 
show the different distributive patterns which would arise from 
these alternatives. 
 • Second, we move beyond specific examples to look at the overall 
impact of the Pension-Related Deduction on the income 
distribution, using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model. 
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Figure 6.1: Impact of Pension-Related Deduction on Net Income by Level 
of Gross Income 
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Figure 6.1 compares the proportionate reductions in net income arising 
from a 7 per cent cut in gross wages and the Pension-Related Deduction as 
amended by the Supplementary Budget. Looking first at the wage cut, ,we 
see that at low incomes, on which no tax is paid, this translates into a 7 per 
cent fall in net incomes. For those paying some tax, the reduction can be as 
low as 4 per cent,27 rising to around 6 per cent for those on top incomes. 
In large measure this pattern arises from the progressive nature of the 
income tax system. Under a progressive tax system, the average tax rate 
rises with income. When income falls, the average tax rate therefore falls, 
attenuating the fall in net income. But this does not apply to those who are 
outside the tax net, for whom a fall in gross income translates into a similar 
proportionate fall in net income. 
 
The pattern from the Pension-Related Deduction, on the other hand, is 
strongly progressive. There is no fall in income for those on low incomes 
(up to €15,000 per annum) and the proportionate income loss rises strongly 
with income to approach 9 per cent for those on very high incomes. The 
pattern is not entirely smooth, however, with a dip in the proportionate 
income loss in a region close to €50,000 per annum. This arises, as Hughes 
and Stewart (2009) point out, because of the kink arising when relief on 
PRD at the top rate of tax begins.28  
 
How did the levy/pension related deduction actually introduced affect 
real households? To answer this question we turn to SWITCH, the ESRI 
tax-benefit model: this allows us to explore how many families in a 
nationally representative sample are actually affected in different ways. The 
rules of the new levy have been incorporated, and we examine the impact 
of actual 2009 policy, with this Pension-Related Deduction, against a 
 
27 The reduction of the impact of the PRD at an income of about €20,000 arises from the 
existence of a step change in PRSI liability at that point; the PRD reduces the income 
liable for PRSI to below the relevant threshold, and therefore, generates an elimination of 
PRSI liability which acts to offset the impact of PRD on net income. 
28 The overall pattern in our analysis, based on the PRD as it applies from May 2009, is 
quite different from the initially introduced scheme as analysed by Hughes and Stewart.  
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baseline of actual 2009 policy without the levy. Our estimates suggest that, in a 
full year, the Pension-Related Deduction (as modified in the Supplementary 
Budget of April 2009) would in aggregate come to some €1,300 million in a 
full year. However, the fact that the deduction would be allowable against 
income tax, PRSI and other levies means that the net impact on revenue is 
likely to be substantially lower. Marginal tax rates facing standard rate and 
top rate taxpayers are about 30 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. An 
average tax rate of 40 per cent on the top slice of income would imply a net 
revenue gain of around €780 million.  
Table 6.1: Distributive Impact of Pension-Related Deduction Across Tax 
Units 
    
Quintile 
Numbers Losing 
(000s) % Gain/Loss 
% Loss of Those Who 
Lose 
Lowest Too Few Too Few Too Few 
2nd 38 -0.3 -3.0 
3rd 57 -0.4 -3.0 
4th 132 -1.0 -3.5 
Top 156 -1.3 -4.4 
Total 382 -0.8 -3.8 
    
 
Table 6.1 shows how the associated losses in disposable income vary 
across the income distribution. Very few families (too few to allow for an 
accurate statistical picture) are affected in the bottom income quintile. For 
those who are affected by the levy, the proportionate loss in income is 
between 3 and 3½ per cent for quintiles 2 to 4. Higher losses, about 4½ 
per cent, are recorded by those in the top quintile. Thus, the pattern within 
those affected by the levy is somewhat progressive. What about the impact 
on the overall income distribution? Close to two-thirds of the families 
affected are in the top three deciles of income adjusted for family size and 
composition; and about three-quarters are in the top two quintiles. As a 
result, the impact is broadly progressive across the overall income 
distribution, with average losses negligible for the poorest quintile per cent 
of families, and the remainder of the bottom half of the income 
distribution seeing losses of 0.3 per cent. Percentage losses rise to 1 per 
cent or more for the top two quintiles. 
 
 The pension-related deduction was introduced in response to a crisis in 
the public finances. Should it now be regarded as a temporary measure, to 
be reversed or revised? Or should it be seen as a new instrument of policy 
for the longer term, giving government new leverage to attain goals with 
respect to public finance outcomes, public-private sector wage differentials 
and/or income distribution? The analysis above suggests some caution is 
appropriate in thinking about a future role for the pension-related 
deduction. 
6.4 
Conclusion 
 
Perhaps the strongest rationale for the pension-related deduction is that 
it serves as a mechanism for reducing net public sector spending, while 
avoiding the political economy difficulties of reducing wage rates explicitly. 
However, there are serious disadvantages associated with achieving the cost 
reduction in this fashion, which involves concentrating the burden of 
adjustment on those currently in employment, while they are in 
employment. An explicit wage rate reduction would also reduce the 
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incomes of current and future pensioners. The pension-related deduction 
does not do this. In this way, it increases the replacement rates for public 
sector workers facing retirement decisions – tending to reduce labour 
supply, in a similar way to an income tax increase. Moreover, the 
progressive structure of the levy may damage labour market efficiency in 
the public sector; broader tax/welfare measures to achieve distributional 
and anti-poverty goals may be more appropriate. 
 
What are the implications of the Pension-Related Deduction for policy 
options involving standardisation of the tax relief on superannuation 
contributions? This depends very much on the interpretation of the PRD. 
If it is seen as a substitute for a wage cut, then the issue of the appropriate 
treatment for superannuation contributions (including the implicit 
government contribution for its employees) remains very much the same as 
before, and the analysis in Chapter 5 is valid. If, on the other hand, the 
PRD is thought of as an alternative to standardisation for the public sector, 
this would rule out the imposition of standardisation on top of the PRD. In 
our view, as explained above, the PRD is best thought of as an imperfect 
substitute for a wage cut, with the added factor of redistribution within the 
current set of public service employees. Given this, it seems that option of 
standardisation of tax relief on all pension contributions (employer and 
employee, explicit and implicit) pension relief remains a valid one to 
consider for both public and private sectors. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The context for analysis of pension issues has changed in recent years 
with the rise in the State Pension and a sharp fall in the “at risk of poverty” 
rate for older persons. The context will continue to change, as coverage 
rates both for private and State Pensions will be higher for cohorts retiring 
now and in the future than for those currently retired. Our analysis finds 
that increased coverage for both State and private pensions will tend to 
lead to further declines in the “at risk of poverty” rate for older persons. 
Taking these findings together, it could be argued that the challenge for the 
future is to maintain the State Pensions at a level similar to their current 
value in relation to earnings; and to improve supplementary pension 
coverage, particularly in the low and low-to-middle income regions where 
coverage is currently lowest. 
 
• In this context, the Green Paper poses three inter-related questions: 
 • Can tax incentives be better targeted to encourage improved 
coverage in a cost-effective way? 
 • Should the overriding principle be coverage or equity? 
 • Should incentives be offered at the marginal, standard or a hybrid 
rate? 
 
Tax incentives can be made more cost-effective if the cost of the 
incentives can be reduced with limited impact on the coverage. Evidence 
from the US and the UK suggests that there is substantial deadweight 
associated with tax-based pension incentives, particularly for those on high 
incomes. If similar patterns obtain in Ireland, then restrictions on tax relief 
for top rate taxpayers could allow for resources to be reallocated in a more 
cost-effective manner.  
 
Two broad approaches could then be taken in respect of the 
coverage/equity issue and the choice of standard or hybrid rate for tax 
relief on pension contributions. The first would be to restrict relief to the 
standard rate, and use methods other than financial incentives to boost 
pension coverage among low-and middle-income earners. It is notable that 
the UK Pensions Commission (2005) concluded that there are …inherent 
behavioural barriers to people making rational long-term savings decisions without 
encouragement… and that its analysis emphasised the role of decision-making 
costs. It recommended what the Green Paper terms a “soft mandatory” 
approach which would require individuals to opt out rather than opt in to 
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pension coverage.29 In this case some of the resources arising from the 
restriction on tax relief could help to support the financing of the State 
Pension. The second approach could also use such behavioural approaches 
to induce higher pension coverage, but would also provide a higher level 
relief, based on tax relief at the hybrid rate, between the standard and top 
rates of tax. This would reduce or eliminate the amount of support 
provided for the State Pension. 
 
Efficient use of public resources is a key concern at all times, and in 
current circumstances becomes even more urgent. In this context, it is 
difficult to justify a tax-based incentive for pensions which mainly benefits 
those at the top of the income distribution. In our view, the reform of the 
system is best undertaken by a combination of tax relief on pension 
contributions with the standard rate, sustaining the State Pension, and 
specific schemes based on a behavioural approach to increase pension 
coverage among low and middle-income earners. 
 
 
 
29 Pension plans under the “soft mandatory” approach could include not only approved 
privately managed schemes but also new publicly managed defined contribution 
schemes, to take advantage of low-cost asset management by NTMA or NPRF, as 
recommended by McHale (2005), the Commission on Taxation (2009) and by Lane 
(2009).  
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